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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NCAA




N 1987, Santa Clara County Superior Court Judge Peter Stone granted
an order and injunction to Stanford University diver Simone LeVant al-
lowing her to compete in NCAA sanctioned competitions.I LeVant had
refused to comply with NCAA regulations requiring her to sign a consent
form that would obligate her to submit to urine testing for various sub-
stances at the NCAA championships. 2 A commentary in Sports Illustrated
noted that Levant's case could lead other courts to the same conclusion: that
the NCAA drug testing program violates constitutional privacy protections
and is unreasonable. 3
Since the California Superior Court ruled in the LeVant case, 4 the legal
landscape of athletics and drug testing is continuing to change. Student ath-
letes are challenging drug testing programs on the basis that they constitute
unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment and under appropriate
1. Levant and Hill v. NCAA, No. 619209, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Super., Santa Clara County,
Mar. 13, 1987) (order granting preliminary injunction); Levant and Hill v. NCAA, reporter's
transcript of proceedings at 2 (Cal. Super., Santa Clara County, Mar. 11, 1987) (hearing on
motion order); see also Stephen F. Brock & Kevin M. McKenna, Drug Testing In Sports, 92
DICK. L. REV. 505, 534-35 n.196 (1988) (summarizing the early proceedings in the LeVant
case).
2. LeVant and Hill v. NCAA, No. 619209 (Cal. Super., Santa Clara County) (com-
plaint). The early style of the case is confusing because Jennifer Hill and J. Barry McKeever
were added as parties in February and July of 1987. See infra note 6 and accompanying text
for further explanation.
3. SPORTS ILLUSTRATED commented:
Stone ruled that the drug testing constituted an "obtrusive, unreasonable and
unconstitutional invasion of privacy" and added that there was a reasonable
probability LeVant would win her case if it went to trial. The case, however,
apparently won't go to trial because the NCAA, fearing a flood of similar chal-
lenges, seems to want it to go quietly away. Richard J. Archer, who represented
the NCAA ... added that Stone's ruling was an isolated one and that LeVant
based her arguments "only on the California constitution." But the U.S. Con-
stitution also guarantees privacy and protects an individual from illegal search
and seizure. And, in fact, decisions in one court often embolden other courts to
take similar action. "I feel wonderful," said LeVant. "I set a precedent." That
remains to be seen.
Incident or Precedent?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 23, 1987, at 18.
4. LeVant and Hill v. NCAA, No. 619209 (Cal. Super., Santa Clara County, Mar. 13,
1987).
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state constitutional privacy protections, in states where that avenue is avail-
able. For example in Hill v. NCAA, 5 where new plaintiffs substituted for
LeVant, who had graduated, a California court of appeals affirmed the supe-
rior court's finding in LeVant, holding that the NCAA program was unrea-
sonable and involved an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. 6
The California Supreme Court is currently reviewing the case, and a deci-
sion is pending. 7 A well-reasoned opinion in the Hill case could prove quite
persuasive in other jurisdictions despite the fact that the Hill case relies pri-
marily on California constitutional protections. The Hill case offers the first
truly thorough examination of the justifications for the drug testing program
implemented by the NCAA, and it involves a state constitutional privacy
protection that is broader than similar Fourth Amendment guarantees.
Analogous state privacy protections currently exist in other states, and they
create a strong likelihood of challenge in these other venues since many suits
based solely on Fourth Amendment grounds have not succeeded.8
Moreover, the Hill case is only one of the most recent challenges to the
drug testing of student athletes. Drug testing is a hotly debated issue around
the country. The courts in other current cases have offered a variety of anal-
yses that are based on both state and federal protections. Some courts have
found the testing programs and procedures unconstitutional, while others
have upheld them, with the decisions often lacking coherent reasoning and
consistency.
The scope of these issues continues to broaden. Challenges to athletic
drug testing programs have been made in local school districts, as well as in
the universities, often in the context of the NCAA program. Given the vari-
ety of methods and the range of jurisdictions in which these programs have
been challenged, this Comment will survey recent case law and attempt to
analyze the future prospects of drug testing in the context of student athlet-
ics. This Comment takes the position that the NCAA program, because it
utilizes random testing methods, comprises an unconstitutional invasion of
the right to privacy, and should be altered to an individualized suspicion
format.
Part II of this Comment focuses on constitutional challenges to drug test-
ing programs, specifically examining recent decisions in significant labor
cases and the rationales behind those cases. Labor organizations have vigor-
ously resisted prohibited substance testing, and the precedents set in these
cases are quite relevant for student athletes in their efforts. Part III discusses
the cases that currently dominate the drug testing of student athletes, com-
paring and contrasting their holdings and justifications. Part IV presents the
5. 230 Cal. App. 3d 1714, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402 (6th Dist.), review granted, 276 Cal. Rptr.
319, 801 P.2d 1070 (Cal. Dec. 20, 1990).
6. 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1747. LeVant obtained a preliminary injunction in March 1987.
It was dissolved by stipulation when she graduated. Hill and McKeever became the current
plaintiffs by an amended complaint. Id.
7. See supra note 5.
8. See David A. Cathcart, Drug and Alcohol Policies and Testing Programs - A Review of
Significant Issues, 588 ALI-ABA 319 (1991) (reviewing issues in Hill and other challenges).
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observations of Forrest Gregg, an individual intimately involved with col-
legiate and professional athletics, and offers his observations on current test-
ing programs. Moreover, this section looks to what the foreseeable future
holds for these drug testing programs. Finally, Part V recommends that the
NCAA adopt a program based on individualized suspicion rather than ran-
dom testing.
II. RECENT LABOR CHALLENGES TO DRUG TESTING UNDER
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: DRUG TESTING IN THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
A. SKINNER V. RAILWAY LABOR EXECUTIVES' ASSOCIATION 9
In Skinner, the United States Supreme Court scrutinized regulations
promulgated by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) governing drug
and alcohol testing of railroad employees.10 The regulations in Skinner
mandated blood and urine tests of employees involved in specified train acci-
dents and allowed the testing of employees who violated certain safety
rules. 1  Justice Kennedy's opinion for the majority is significant to this
Comment's subject matter because it analyzes whether these regulations vio-
late the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and
seizure. 12
1. The Testing Program in Skinner
Justice Kennedy noted, "The problem of alcohol use on American rail-
roads is as old as the industry itself, and efforts to deter it by carrier rules
began at least a century ago."' 3 The FRA was concerned that the regula-
tions present in 1983 were not significant enough to deter alcohol and drug
use by employees,' 4 and in 1985, it set forth new federal regulations on the
subject. 15 The pertinent sections relating to drug testing include subpart C,
entitled "Post-Accident Toxicological Testing," which provides that testing
is mandatory upon the occurrence of specified events.' 6
Similarly, subpart D of the regulations, entitled "Authorization to Test
9. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
10. Under the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, the Secretary of Transportation has
the authority to set forth appropriate rules, regulations, and standards for railroad safety. Id.
at 606; 45 U.S.C. § 431(a) (1991).
11. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606.
12. Id. The Fourth Amendment provides: "[Tihe right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606. The more recent ban includes use or possession of certain
drugs, which are contained in "Rule G," the industry operating rule that is enforced by practi-
cally all railroads in the country.
14. From 1972 to 1983, a survey of U.S. railroads indicated twenty-one major train acci-
dents involving alcohol or drug use, and these accidents resulted in at least twenty-five fatali-
ties and millions of dollars in damages. Id. at 606-07 (summarizing the relevant accident
investigation safety reports).
15. 49 C.F.R. § 219.101 (1991).
16. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 609. Toxicological testing is required following a major train
accident, defined as any accident involving: (i) a fatality, (ii) the release of hazardous material
1992]
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for Cause," is permissive rather than mandatory and more relevant to the
constitutional analysis involved in challenging the drug testing of student
athletes. With respect to the urine tests authorized under subpart D, they
may be ordered: (1) after a reportable accident or incident, where a supervi-
sor has reasonable suspicion that an employee's actions or lack of action
contributed to the accident or enhanced its severity,17 or (2) in the event of
specific rules violations.18 The only other time a railroad may require urine
tests is when supervisors suspect impairment and at least two supervisors
determine that the appropriate circumstances exist. 19 When the supervisors
suspect a substance other than alcohol to be the cause of impairment, at least
one of the supervisors involved must be specially trained in detecting signs of
drug use.20
2. The Fourth Amendment Standard
Looking to the proper application of the Fourth Amendment in the Skin-
ner situation, the Supreme Court recalled that "[a]lthough the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to a search or seizure, even an arbitrary one,
effected by a private party on his own initiative, the Amendment protects
against such intrusions if the private party acted as an instrument or agent of
the government. ' 21 The Court also noted that whether a private party may
be deemed an agent or instrumentality of the government depends on the
degree of the government's participation in the private party's activities. 22
With respect to the urine testing aspect of the regulations, the Court said,
"Because it is clear that the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon
expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable, the
federal courts of appeals have concluded unanimously, and we agree, that
these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment. '23
Thus, urinalysis clearly constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment, however, only prohibits those searches and
seizures that are unreasonable. Reasonableness is judged by balancing the
privacy intrusion on the individual against the legitimate governmental in-
terests to be promoted. 24 Generally, the search of a person must be based on
accompanied by an excavation or reportable injury, or (iii) damage to railroad property of
$500,000 or more. 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a)(1) (1991).
17. 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(c)(1) (1991).
18. Id.
19. Id. § 219.301(c)(2)(i).
20. Id. § 219.301(c)(2)(ii). Whenever the result of a breath test is intended for use in a
disciplinary proceeding, the employee must be given the opportunity to provide a blood sample
for analysis at an independent medical facility. Id. § 219.303(c)(1). When a urine sample
yields a positive result, the employee has sixty days to provide to the Medical Review Officer a
written request for a retest. This request must specify that an approved second laboratory
perform the analysis, and the employee may be required to pay for shipment costs and the
reanalysis. If a negative result ensues, the railroad will reimburse the employee for these costs.
Id. § 219.709(b).
21. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614; United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971).
22. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614.
23. Id. at 617.
24. Id at 619.
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probable cause that the person has violated the law.25 The Supreme Court
noted, however, that "[w]hen the balance of interests precludes insistence on
a showing of probable cause, we have usually required 'some quantum of
individualized suspicion' before concluding that a search is reasonable."
2 6
Specifically, the Skinner court looked to New Jersey v. TL.0.27 to deter-
mine the proper analysis to utilize. The Court recognized that where pri-
vacy interests are minimal and important governmental interests compel the
intrusion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of individual suspi-
cion. 28  It is within this limited niche that random drug testing programs
attempt to justify their existence.
3. The Balancing Test
The federal courts have declared most drug testing programs that do not
require individualized suspicion unconstitutional in the labor context.
29
But, in this case, the Supreme Court felt that any individualized suspicion
requirement was justifiably waived 30 because the Court observed that the
purpose of the FRA regulations was not to assist in the prosecution of em-
ployees but to prevent accidents. 3 1 Justifiably, the Court was very cautious
25. Id. at 624.
26. Id.; see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976).
27. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). In T.LO., the Supreme Court laid out a two-part test to deter-
mine the reasonableness of a search without a warrant or probable cause, in the context of a
public high school. In the case, a school administrator had searched a student's purse for
banned substances based on the suspicion that the student was smoking on school grounds in
violation of school policy. The Skinner court interpreted the "reasonableness" test to be (1)
whether the privacy interests affected are minimal, and (2) whether an important governmen-
tal interest is furthered by the intrusion. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624. In the context of collegiate
drug-testing, the court in O'Halloran v. University of Wash., 679 F. Supp. 997 (W.D. Wash.),
rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988), looked to the T.LO. test and interpreted
the "reasonableness" inquiry as: (1) whether a search was justified initially, and (2) whether a
search, as conducted, was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place. O'Halloran, 697 F. Supp. at 1004; see also David R. Cochran,
The Privacy Expectation: A Comparison of Federal and California Constitutional Standards for
Drug Testing in Amateur Athletics, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 533 (1990) (examining T.LO.,
Skinner, O'Halloran, and the relationship of the cases).
28. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
29. See Craig H. Thaler, Note, The National Collegiate Athletic Association, Random
Drug-Testing, and the Applicability of the Administrative Search Exception, 17 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 641, 643 n. 14 (1989), citing, with regard to Fourth Amendment requirements: Lovvorn
v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988) (reasonable suspicion required in order
for city to test fire fighters); Thomson v. Weinberger, 682 F. Supp. 829 (D. Md. 1988) (U.S.
Army's drug-testing program found unconstitutional since no reasonable suspicion was re-
quired before a person could be tested); Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(testing of prison officers unconstitutional without reasonable suspicion); Amalgamated
Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560 (C.D. Cal. 1987)
(testing city bus drivers unconstitutional without reasonable suspicion); Feliciano v. City of
Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (unconstitutional to test police cadets without
reasonable suspicion); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986) (unconsti-
tutional to test fire fighters without reasonable suspicion); Patchhogue-Medford Congress of
Teachers v. Board of Educ., 119 A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (2d Dept. 1986), aff'd, 70
N.Y.2d 57, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1987) (must have reasonable suspicion to test public school
teachers).
30. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624-25.
31. Id. at 620-21; 49 C.F.R. § 219.1(a)-(1991).
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in concluding that the urine tests were permitted without individualized sus-
picion. 32 The Court determined that the expectations of privacy for railroad
employees were diminished by the nature of the industry, which was heavily
regulated to ensure everyone's safety, and because the safety goals of the
industry depended on the fitness and competence of the employees.33 Given
the employee's diminished expectation of privacy and the government's
compelling interest in testing, the Court concluded that the alcohol and drug
tests under subparts C and D of the FRA regulations were reasonable with
respect to the Fourth Amendment, despite the recognized lack of individual-
ized suspicion.34
4. The Real Basis for the Court's Decision
The Court purports to conclude that no individualized suspicion is uti-
lized in the FRA testing process, and it states that it is upholding the pro-
gram because the governmental interest in testing is compelling and
outweighs the privacy invasion. 35 Those statements by the Court are mis-
leading. The Court is actually upholding the testing program because indi-
vidualized suspicion does exist in the guise of an accident, or a well-trained
supervisor observing an employee acting erratically. 36 No one is randomly
investigated under the regulations. Rather, a major accident or some type of
behavior that raises suspicion about the individual is required to permit
urinalysis. In this sense, the Court is saying that since these safeguards exist
for the employees, any possibility of a privacy intrusion is severely limited
and therefore the testing program is acceptable. 37
32. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626; see infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. The Skinner
Court stated:
We recognize, however, that the procedures for collecting the necessary sam-
ples, which require employees to perform an excretory function traditionally
shielded by great privacy, raises concerns not implicated by blood or breath
tests. While we would not characterize these additional privacy concerns as
minimal in most contexts, we note that the regulations endeavor to reduce the
intrusiveness of the collection process. The regulations do not require that sam-
ples be furnished under the direct observation of a monitor, despite the desirability
of such a procedure to ensure the integrity of the sample .... The sample is also
collected in a medical environment, by personnel unrelated to the railroad em-
ployer, and is thus not unlike similar procedures encountered often in the con-
text of a regular physical examination.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 627.
34. Id. at 627, 634. The dissent in the case, however, vigorously opposed the program as
an unreasonable violation of the Fourth Amendment. Justices Marshall and Brennan both felt
uncomfortable dismissing the "reasonable suspicion" standard as impracticable. Id. at 637.
More significantly, they felt that the FRA field manual instructed supervisors to directly ob-
serve the employees while urinating for the test. Id. at 646. Marshall stated, "[T]he majority
dismisses as nonexistent the intrusiveness of such 'direct observation', on the ground that FRA
regulations state that such observation is not required." Id. at 646 n.8. Marshall noted that the
regulations also state that observation is the most effective means of verifying the validity of
the sample and it is unlikely the supervisors would disregard such commands in the field man-
ual. Id.
35. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628, 633.
36. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
37. This may well be the difference between Scalia and Stevens siding with the majority in
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B. NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION V. VON RAAB 38
In Von Raab, decided the same day as Skinner, the Court determined that
the United States Customs Service did not violate the Fourth Amendment
when it mandated that employees who sought transfer or promotion to cer-
tain positions in the Service would be required to submit to a urinalysis
test.39 Specifically, the Service sought to test those employees directly in-
volved in drug enforcement, those who carried firearms, and those exposed
to sensitive materials. 4° If an employee otherwise qualified for a position
that fell within the testing provisions, he or she was then advised of the drug
testing requirement. 41 The tests screened for marijuana, cocaine, opiates,
amphetamines, and phencyclidine.4 2
1. The Factors in Favor of Upholding of the Program
The Fifth Circuit held that the required searches were reasonable with
respect to the Fourth Amendment, noting that the Customs Service had at-
tempted to minimize the intrusiveness by not requiring visual observation of
the act of urination.43 The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's judg-
ment with respect to the testing of employees directly involved in drug in-
terdiction and the agents who carried guns, but it vacated and remanded the
Fifth Circuit's decision with respect to employees who merely handled clas-
Skinner, and dissenting in Von Raab, where it is clear that no form of individualized suspicion
existed in the testing program. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
38. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
39. Id. at 679.
40. Id. at 660-61. The Commissioner of Customs implemented the drug-testing program
in 1986, and drug tests were made a condition for positions that met one or more of three
criteria: (1) direct involvement in drug interdiction or enforcement of directly related laws, (2)
employees who must carry firearms, and (3) employees who must access classified material. Id.
41. Id. at 661. With respect to the actual procedures involved, the Court stated:
After an employee qualifies for a position covered by the customs testing pro-
gram, the Service advises him by letter that his final selection is contingent upon
successful completion of drug screening. An independent contractor contacts
the employee to fix the time and place for collecting the sample. On reporting
for the test, the employee must produce photographic identification and remove
any outer garments, such as a coat or a jacket, and personal belongings. The
employee may produce the sample behind a partition, or in the privacy of a
bathroom stall if he so chooses. To ensure against adulteration of the specimen,
or substitution of a sample from another person, a monitor of the same sex as
the employee remains close at hand to listen for the normal sounds of urination.
Dye is added to the toilet water to prevent the employee from using the water to
adulterate the sample.
Upon receiving the specimen, the monitor inspects it to ensure its proper tem-
perature and color, and places a tamper-proof custody seal over the container,
and affixes an identification label indicating the date and the individual's speci-
men number. The employee signs a chain-of-custody form, which is initialed by
the monitor, and the urine sample is placed in a plastic bag, sealed, and submit-
ted to a laboratory.
Id.
42. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 662.
43. National Treasury Employees Union v. Van Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 177 (5th Cir. 1987),
aff'd in part, vacated in part, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). The Fifth Circuit also stated that the
government had a compelling interest in assuring that its employees were not using drugs.




The Supreme Court recognized that the government has a compelling in-
terest in employing interdiction personnel that are of the highest integrity
and judgment.45 The Court stated that employees in sensitive government
positions, like interdiction personnel, have a lower privacy expectation with
regard to personal searches.46 It also accepted the need to test customs offi-
cials entrusted to carry firearms. 47 With respect to the privacy intrusion
implicated by testing these persons, the Court acknowledged that because
the monitor does not directly observe the actual urination, the intrusion on
privacy is further reduced. 48 Therefore, the testing of the employees was
upheld.49
On the other hand, the Court remanded the portion of the case involving
the testing of workers who would handle classified materials because it
wanted a more "bright-line" delineation of exactly which employees fell into
that category so that solid justifications for testing those employees could be
enunciated. 50 By providing such careful scrutiny and remanding the portion
of the case involving employees handling classified materials, the Court in
Von Raab obviously took notice of the fundamental requirement necessary
to find such an intrusion reasonable: the governmental interest must clearly
outweigh the privacy intrusion. 5'
2. A Surprising Dissent
While Justices Scalia and Stevens sided with the majority in Skinner, they
dissented in Von Raab, along with Justices Marshall and Brennan, who had
dissented in Skinner.52 Justice Scalia stated that he dissented from this opin-
ion because the justifications, in this context, were not adequate to necessi-
tate the intrusive urine testing.5 3 He remarked, "If such a generalization
44. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 664-65.
45. Id. at 670 (noting that the public interest in protecting the nation's borders justified
the level of intrusiveness in this case).
46. Id. at 671. For example, employees at the U.S. Mint should expect to be searched
when they leave work, and military personnel are subject to intrusions required to assure loy-
alty and trust. Id.
47. Id. at 672. The Court observed that the dexterity and judgment of employees carrying
firearms is extremely important and this factor reduces the expectation of privacy. Id.
48. Id. at 672-73 n.2. In this context, the Court mentioned, along with the fact that the
regulations did not require the direct observation of the act of urination, that the urine samples
could be examined only for specified drugs, with the employee being required to disclose per-
sonal medical information only if his test result is positive. Id.
49. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679.
50. Id. at 677-78.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 679-80.
53. Id. at 680-81. Scalia said:
Today, in Skinner, we allow a less intrusive bodily search of railroad employees
involved in train accidents. I joined the Court's opinion there because the
demonstrated frequency of drug and alcohol use by the targeted class of employ-
ees, and the demonstrated connection between such use and grave harm, ren-
dered the search a reasonable means of protecting society.
I decline to join the Court's opinion in the present case because neither fre-
quency of use nor connection to harm is demonstrated or even likely. In my
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suffices to justify demeaning bodily searches, without particularized suspi-
cion, to guard against the bribing or blackmailing of a law enforcement
agent, or the careless use of a firearm, then the Fourth Amendment has
become frail protection indeed."'54 Given Justice Scalia's generally conserva-
tive tendencies, his recognition of these privacy interests in this context of-
fers some hope to those who fear the Court will severely diminish privacy
interests without a challenge.
C. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE LABOR CASES
The Supreme Court makes clear in Skinner and Von Raab that drug test-
ing regulations must bear a reasonable relationship to legitimate goals and
needs. The waiver of probable cause or individualized suspicion will be per-
mitted only in very limited circumstances, such as the school setting in
T.L.0."5 Any overly-intrusive methods will not be accepted under a Fourth
Amendment search and seizure analysis.
Random drug testing programs face a heavy burden in meeting the bal-
ancing test, and safety or individualized suspicion are often the determining
factors. When one closely examines the Skinner opinion, individualized sus-
picion is clearly present in some form, and that fact helped the Court to
uphold the program. 56 Moreover, the safety justifications in Skinner were
immense, given the potential for loss of life, and this factor added to the
balance in favor of upholding the program.57 In Von Raab, however, while
the safety concern was present to a lesser degree, the fact that no individual-
ized suspicion requirement existed weighed against the program for several
of the Justices. The dissenting members of the Court in Von Raab take the
balancing test very seriously and will not allow privacy intrusions, without
individualized suspicion, when the only counterbalancing factors are general
safety interests.58
view the Customs Service rules are a kind of immolation of privacy and human
dignity in symbolic opposition to drug use .... The Court's opinion in the
present case... will be searched in vain for real evidence of a real problem that
will be solved by urine testing of Customs Service employees.
Id.
54. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 684.
55. 469 U.S. 325 (1985); see supra note 27.
56. See supra notes 16-20, 35-37 and accompanying text. For the importance of safety
and individual suspicion in the balancing test, see Tanks v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit
Auth., 930 F.2d 475 (6th Cir. 1991) (discussing Skinner and Von Raab and finding reasonable
a transit authority's drug testing of a bus driver after a collision due to the presence of some
level of individualized suspicion); but c.f International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Depart-
ment of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
the Navy from randomly testing civilian employees who possess top secret security clearances).
57. See supra note 14.
58. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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III. DRUG TESTING OF STUDENT ATHLETES: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES
A. EARLY CHALLENGES
1. O'Halloran v. University of Washington59
O'Halloran involved a challenge to the University of Washington's drug
testing program for athletes, under the Fourth Amendment and the Wash-
ington Constitution.6 The University's program would have required some
800 athletes to undergo testing during their annual medical exams. The im-
portance of the superior court opinion from this Comment's perspective is
that courts have determined the privacy protection offered by the Washing-
ton Constitution to be broader than that offered by the Fourth
Amendment. 6 1
a. The Superior Court Decision
On July 23, 1987, King County Superior Court Judge Mattson issued an
oral ruling that enjoined the University of Washington from implementing
its drug testing policy against Elizabeth O'Halloran.6 2 The judge was con-
cerned with (1) whether the university had any legal basis upon which it
could assure confidentiality (he ultimately concluded that this was of less
importance than his second concern), and (2) whether the plan was
constitutional. 63
With respect to the constitutionality of the program, Judge Mattson noted
that visual observation of urination and the testing of the specimen would
generally constitute an improper intrusion into private matters. 64 He ap-
plied a balancing test, pitting the school's interests65 in the test results
59. No. 87-2-08775-1 (Wash. Super., King County, July 23, 1987), removed sub. nom.,
679 F. Supp. 997 (W.D. Wash. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988),
withdrawn No. 87-2-08775-1, subn. 65 (King Co. Super. Ct. 1989).
60. See O'Halloran v. University of Wash., No. 87-2-08775-1 (Wash. Super., King
County, July 23, 1987) (transcript of oral opinion) [hereinafter O'Halloran transcript]. For a
in-depth discussion of O'Halloran and related topics, see Brock & McKenna, supra note 1, at
538, 548-51.
61. Article I, section 7 provides:
INVASION OF PRIVATE AFFAIRS OR HOME PROHIBITED
No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law.
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. See also State v. Butterworth, 48 Wa. App. 152, 737 P.2d 1297 (1st
Div. 1987) (The court found art. I, § 7 violated when police obtained an unlisted address and
phone number without a warrant because the Washington Constitution is much broader than
the Fourth Amendment and clearly extends rights and protections beyond it.).
62. See O'Halloran transcript, supra note 60.
63. Id. at 5-6.
64. Id. at 6. The judge also believed that the proposed testing should be ruled unconstitu-
tional because the burden of persuasion in such constitutional matters fell to the state.
65. Judge Mattson found the university's purported interests to be: (1) advancing the
safety of those tested; (2) promoting the safety of the athlete's teammates; (3) achieving fair-
ness in athletic competition; (4) protecting the school's image; and (5) protecting the financial
status of the university and its athletic programs, particularly its football and basketball pro-




against the invasion and personal intrusion involved in a monitored urine
test. Judge Mattson found that, as a matter of law, the program violated the
Fourth Amendment and the Washington Constitution.66 He believed the
program would not further the University's interests to the extent necessary
to validate the intrusion, primarily because the evidence had not convinced
him that any drug use had harmed the interests that the school sought to
protect. He cited the fact that the school had only two substantiated cases in
approximately five years where a competitive athlete was affected by drugs.67
To further support his decision, he stated that evidence of a special drug
problem among athletes would be required to make the invasion reasonable.
He also found that no testing was scheduled for other University students
whose performance could be impaired by drugs, and he recalled that mass
testing of firefighters had been ruled unconstitutional in an earlier Washing-
ton decision, even though the state's interests and rationales in having drug-
free firefighters were much greater than mere athletes. 68 Hence, he felt the
program could not withstand such scrutiny.
Judge Mattson advised the University, however, that the NCAA should
be joined as a party to avoid sanctions that could be imposed on the school. 69
The University then joined the NCAA as a party. After being joined, the
NCAA removed the action to federal district court, and the plaintiffs' mo-
tion to remand was denied.70 The federal district court proceeded to ex-
amine the procedures involved in the NCAA's program, focusing on the
program's constitutionality under federal law.7' Specifically, the court ex-
amined the regulations and methods under which testing occurred. 72
66. Id. at 17. Although the NCAA had not been joined in the superior court action,
Judge Mattson commented:
It is clear that the NCAA's requirement of all athletes consenting in writing to
random post-season drug testing as a condition of the University's right to par-
ticipate in post-season championships and bowl events suffers from even more
constitutional deficiencies than does the University of Washington's proposed
program, which is much more structured and much more limited.
Id. at 20-21.
67. Id. at 4, 10-11.
68. Id. at 12-13.
69. Id. at 21. Judge Mattson eventually ordered the NCAA to be joined as a third party
defendant. See O'Halloran v. University of Wash., No. 87-2-08775-1 (Wash. Super., King
County, July 24, 1987) (order compelling joinder). He also issued a temporary restraining
order prohibiting the NCAA from imposing penalties on the University of Washington for not
adopting its own or the NCAA's testing program. O'Halloran transcript, supra note 60, at 21-
22 (temporary restraining order and order to show cause).
70. O'Halloran v. University of Wash., 679 F. Supp. 997, 998 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
71. The district court stated:
The NCAA's drug-testing program requires student athletes annually, prior to
participation in intercollegiate competition during the academic year in ques-
tion, to sign a statement in which he/she ... submits information related to
eligibility, recruitment, financial aid, amateur status and involvement in organ-
ized gambling activities concerning intercollegiate athletics competition under
the governing legislation of this Association, and consents to be tested for the
use of drugs prohibited by NCAA legislation.
Id. at 998. See also 1987-88 NCAA Drug-Testing Program, Part II, Constitution 3-9-(i) (de-
tailing the program).
72. The specimen collection procedures under the testing program were set forth in
§§ 5.0-5.5. The district court examined the provisions and explained:
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b. The Federal District Court's Opinion
O'Halloran based her claim on United States Code section 1983, which
requires that the allegedly unconstitutional conduct complained of be com-
mitted under the color of state law. 73 Therefore, the first issue addressed by
the district court was whether or not the NCAA constituted a state actor.
After a short discussion of the issue, the court found that the NCAA was a
private entity and not a state actor.74 Even though the judge felt the "state
actor" requirement had not been met, the court proceeded to analyze the
second factor anyway: a deprivation of rights under the Constitution.75
c. The Fourth Amendment Inquiry
After accepting that the urine test was a search, the lower court focused
its attention on whether that search was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. 76 The court approached the reasonableness inquiry by means
of its interpretation of the two-part test set forth in TL.O. 77 The O'Halloran
court phrased the inquiry as (1) are there reasonable grounds for expecting
that urinalysis of student-athletes will show evidence of drug use, and (2) is
the scope of the program tailored to fit the need?78 The court concluded that
the testing program was reasonable after attempting to balance both sides'
interests. 79 The court concluded "that the expectation of privacy alleged is
diminished in an athletic program... and that the relative encroachment is
outweighed by the greater interests in the health of the student-athletes and
The student athlete must among other things appear at a time certain as noti-
fied, provide adequate identification, and provide a urine sample in a beaker
provided in a sealed plastic bag. The furnishing of the specimen will be moni-
tored by observation to insure the integrity of the sample. A witness may ac-
company the student-athlete to the collection station to certify identification and
observe processing of the forms and the specimen.
O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 999.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). To state a claim under § 1983, one must establish two ele-
ments: "(1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state
law; and (2) this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States." Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).
74. See O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1001-02; see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S.
830 (1982) (remedial school's discharge of some employees did not constitute a state action for
the purposes of the First or Fourteenth Amendment, even though the school relied on some
public funds); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (patient care decisions made by individ-
ual doctors at a state-funded nursing home are not "state action."); Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746
F.2d 1019 (4th Cir. 1984) (adoption of an NCAA rule which denied eligibility for further
intercollegiate competition was not state action).
75. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1002.
76. Id.
77. 469 U.S. at 337 (1985); see supra note 27.
78. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1004-05. The court felt that the only basis needed for the
NCAA to conduct this testing was evidence of some past incidents of improler drug use by
athletes. The court believed that since the media had directed attention to these incidents, and
since the suspicion was directed at particular participants in an activity rather than randomly
picking individuals out off the street, no unreasonable intrusion was involved. Id. The court
noted that other questions regarding the reasonableness of the testing would be dealt with in its
privacy analysis. Id.




The district court's approach to the privacy analysis is surprising. The
analysis trivializes the plaintiff's claim that monitored urination is an inva-
sion of privacy, stating that it is a "small intrusion in the context of a univer-
sity's athletic program."8 1 The fact that some element of "communal
undress" is present in an athletic context and that the athletes must rou-
tinely undergo medical examinations appeared to be the basis for the court's
conclusion that the monitored urine testing is constitutionally acceptable. 82
d. The Opinion's Shortcomings
The concern about what information could be revealed by the tests was, in
the district court's opinion, lessened by the fact that the NCAA would seek
out only certain banned substances.8 3 The court, however, failed to recog-
nize that the NCAA's list of substances is not inclusive, instead touting the
affidavit of Robert Dugal, a member of the International Olympic Commit-
tee Medical Commission, who disclosed many of the evils of drug use.8 4 In
the process, the court failed to take into account the broader privacy protec-
tion offered by the Washington Constitution than by the Fourth Amend-
ment, or to take seriously the legitimate concerns set forth by O'Halloran.
While the goals of the court may be laudable, the failure to adhere to
obvious constitutional standards is apparent in the opinion. Unfortunately,
on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the case was reversed on a procedural techni-
cality, eventually remanded to state court, and finally dismissed.8 5 Though
no clear and final decision has evolved from the case, it was one of the first
cases to focus on the relevant issues necessary in such a privacy challenge.
Given that the privacy protections offered under the Washington Constitu-
tion are broader than under the Fourth Amendment, the likelihood of suc-
cess on a Washington constitutional-based challenge to a drug testing
program is more probable due to the increased scrutiny such invasions face




83. O'Halloran, 697 F. Supp. at 1005.
84. Id. at 1006-07.
85. See O'Halloran v. University of Wash., 856 F.2d 1375, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988), where
the Ninth Circuit determined that the state's third party complaint against the NCAA was an
issue of state law, and that the NCAA could not properly claim the presence of diversity
jurisdiction. Specifically, while O'Halloran's motion was pending, the university withdrew its
plan to test without individualized suspicion, and therefore all charges against the school were
dropped. The only remaining issue became whether the NCAA could penalize the school for
failure to conduct a drug testing program, and the Ninth Circuit ruled this was a pure question
of state law. See O'Halloran, 856 F.2d at 1381; see also Cochran, supra note 27, at 537 n.31.
The Ninth Circuit sent the case back to the state court, where it was ultimately dismissed.
Therefore, it is questionable whether the superior court or district court opinion has more
precedential value. In the author's opinion, it is clear the superior court opinion more closely
adheres to guiding constitutional principles.
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2. Schaill by Kross v. Tippecanoe County School Corporation8 6
Schaill appears to provide support for those who favor drug testing. The
school corporation in question implemented a drug testing program involv-
ing high school athletes and other extra-curricular participants. Specifically,
in the fall of 1987, after discovering the use of marijuana by five baseball
players, the board of trustees for Tippecanoe County School Corporation
(TSC) adopted a drug testing program requiring all student athletes and
cheerleaders to be tested by random urinalysis.8 7 If students wished to par-
ticipate in athletics they and their parents were required to sign a consent
form whereby the students agreed to submit to random urinalysis. Failure
to consent brought varying levels of penalties and suspensions.8 The
method of selection for testing was random.8 9
Darcy Schaill and another student athlete attacked the program under
United States Code section 1983, as an unreasonable search violating the
Fourth Amendment, and also on due process grounds.90 The federal district
court denied relief for the search and seizure and due process claims. 91
Upon further consideration, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of
the district court.92 In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit began with a discus-
sion that reaffirmed that a urine test is a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. 93 The court explained, "The fact that urine is volunta-
86. 679 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Ind. 1988), aff'd, 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
87. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1310.
88. The actual penalties imposed were: a suspension from 30% of all games for a first
positive test, a 50% suspension for a second positive, a one year suspension for a third positive,
with a fourth positive resulting in the student being banned for the rest of high school. Schaill,
874 F.2d at 1311.
89. Specifically, a piece of paper with each athlete's assigned number was placed in a box,
with the athletic director and the head coach of each team allowed to choose numbers during
the particular sports season. The Seventh Circuit further described the actual procedure:
The student selected for testing is accompanied by a school official of the same
sex to a bathroom, where the student is provided with an empty specimen bottle.
The student is then allowed to enter a lavatory stall and close the door in order
to produce a sample. The student is not under direct visual observation while
producing the sample; however, the water in the toilet is tinted to prevent the
student from substituting water for the sample, the monitor stands outside the
stall to listen for the normal sounds of urination and the monitor checks the
temperature of the sample by hand to assure its genuineness.
Id.
90. Id. at 1310-11; see also Note, Search and Seizure-Suspicionless Drug Testing-Sev-
enth Circuit Upholds Drug Testing of Student Athletes in the Public Schools.-Schaill v. Tippe-
canoe County School Corp., 103 HARV. L. REV. 591, 596 (1989) [hereinafter Search and
Seizure] (stating that the court focused on the need for regulation in the school environment
and ignored the potential of cooperation and education).
91. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch., 679 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Ind. 1988) (the district
court concluded that the tests were searches under the Fourth Amendment but that they were
not unreasonable).
92. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1310.
93. The court stated:
There can be little doubt that a person engaged in the act of urination possesses
a reasonable expectation of privacy as to that act, and as to the urine which is
excreted. In our society, it is expected that urination be performed in private,
that urine be disposed of in private and that the act, if mentioned at all, be
described in euphemistic terms.
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rily discharged from the body and treated as a waste product does not elimi-
nate the expectation of privacy which an individual possesses in his or her
urine." 94 Since a great deal can be determined about a person by conducting
a urinalysis, such a search raises privacy concerns and must be analyzed
under proper constitutional scrutiny.
a. The Reasonableness of the Search: The Proper Inquiry?
The appellate court next inquired into the reasonableness of the search
and the level of suspicion required under constitutional standards. 95 The
court determined it should recognize the test utilized in New Jersey v. T.L.O.
as the guiding precedent in its analysis.96 The essence of the T.L. 0. decision
is that a school environment forces teachers to utilize fast and informal disci-
plinary procedures and that warrant and probable cause requirements are
impractical in that limited context: school searches are to be evaluated on
the basis of their reasonableness under all the circumstances. 97
Rather than utilizing a proper constitutional analysis to determine
whether this was a situation calling for some form of individualized suspi-
cion, the Seventh Circuit arbitrarily decided that the school corporation
need only meet the less-demanding general reasonableness standard set forth
in T.L. 0.98 The significance of this leap by the court is that it circumvented
the proper inquiry into whether or not some form of individualized suspicion
was required by the circumstances of this case and Fourth Amendment con-
stitutional safeguards. The Schaill court appears to read T.L.O. as giving
courts a free hand to apply a reasonableness test to any search in an aca-
demic context. Such a conclusion is in no way justified.
The court in Schaill never properly addressed the question of whether the
search involved in the TSC drug testing program, conducted without the
higher standard of individualized suspicion, was justified under constitu-
tional standards in this particular instance. Such a finding is, however, im-
plied by its discussion of the many cases where the individualized suspicion
requirement does not apply. 99 After examining certain situations where in-
Id. at 1312.
94. Id.
95. Id.; see Search & Seizure, supra note 90, at 593.
96. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1314.
97. Id.; see also Search and Seizure, supra note 90, at 593 (raising the relevant point that
the Schaill court failed to consider that the school environment is perfectly suited to the imple-
mentation of a drug testing program based on individual suspicion, and noting that while
probable cause is too stringent a standard for the school environment, the court should resist
departing from the principle that evidence is required to infringe upon an individual's privacy).
98. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1315. As recently noted, "[s]uspicionless searches remain a rela-
tively new phenomenon in fourth amendment jurisprudence" and it was not until the later
cases of Skinner and Von Raab that the Supreme Court ever approved a suspicionless search
that intruded on a person's bodily integrity. See Search & Seizure, supra note 90, at 595.
99. See Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1316-17. The Schaill court discussed the T.L.O. decision and
stated:
In T.L 0. the Supreme Court expressly reserved decision on whether individual-
ized suspicion was always necessary to validate a search under the reasonable-
ness standard adopted in that case. The Court noted that there was no
"irreducible requirement" that individualized suspicion be present for a search
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dividualized suspicion was not required,' °° the court turned to the actual
balancing test implicated by a reasonableness analysis.' 0 ' The court noted
that, on the one hand, there is an obvious expectation of privacy associated
with the act of urination. 10 2 However, the court stated:
[T]he privacy considerations are somewhat mitigated on the facts before
us because the provider of the urine sample enters a closed lavatory stall
and the person monitoring the urination stands outside listening for the
sounds appropriate for what is taking place. The invasion of privacy is
therefore not nearly as severe as would be the case if the monitor were
required to observe the subject in the act of urination.10 3
The court, like the O'Halloran court, also emphasized that there was "an
element of 'communal undress' inherent in athletic participation," which it
believed led to a lessening of personal expectations of privacy.1 4 Similarly,
since student athletes and cheerleaders who participated prior to the drug
program had been obligated to give a urine sample in relationship to a
mandatory physical exam each year, the court viewed the new procedures as
only slightly more intrusive.105
b. More Difficulties in the Court's Analysis
At this point in the privacy analysis, the reasoning of the court is difficult
to follow. After recalling that the urine sample taken during the routine
medical exams in the past had not been monitored, had only been tested for
sugar, and was only seen by the student's private physician, the court stated
that "[t]he fact that such samples are required suggests that legitimate ex-
pectations of privacy in this context are diminished."'06 There is obviously a
great difference between giving an unmonitored urine sample to one's per-
sonal physician in the context of a routine physical examination and giving
one in the presence of a school official so that the sample can be tested for
drug use.
The court's privacy analysis, however, continued and the court revealed
to be constitutional: it also observed that "[e]xceptions to the requirement of
individualized suspicion are generally appropriate only where the privacy inter-
ests implicated by a search are minimal and where 'other safeguards' are avail-
able to assure that the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not
"subject to the discretion of the official in the field."
Id. at 1315 n.5.
It is from this logic that the court in Schaill seems to imply that no individualized suspicion
is required in the TSC situation. To reach such a conclusion would require a finding that the
privacy interests implicated are minimal and that sufficient safeguards in any program exist to
protect people from subjective discretion. Given the later Skinner and Von Raab decisions, the
Schaill court's reasoning is improper. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
100. Note that these cases do not implicate situations involving a search nearly as intrusive
as the TSC drug testing program. See Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1316-17.




105. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1318; see also Search and Seizure, supra note 90, at 594 (noting
that since the students usually provide their personal physician with a urine sample, they
would have a lesser expectation of privacy in providing one to school officials).
106. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1318.
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the existence of another element that it believed weighed against the stu-
dent's expectations of privacy: the students were participants in "interscho-
lastic athletics." 107 The Indiana High School Athletic Association required
minimum grade averages and imposed residency and eligibility require-
ments. The court believed that these characteristics of athletic participation
further reduced any expectation of privacy.' 08 But the logic of comparing
the requirement of submission to a urine test to a prohibition on drinking or
smoking does not present a sensible analysis of the degree of privacy in-
vaded. t°9 The court, in attempting to show the similarities between drug
testing and other prohibitions in interscholastic athletics, loses sight of the
differences in the means and the end. For example, the court states that
prohibitions on drinking, smoking, and drug use have been upheld against
state and federal constitutional challenges. Such an analysis, however, is un-
fulfilling because stopping teens from using drugs or alcohol is the end to be
achieved; obviously such regulations will not fail a constitutional analysis.
But the drug testing program adopted by TSC is the means to secure that
end and clearly involves a much greater degree of intrusion and cannot be
analyzed in the same manner. The cases the court cites are cases where
athletes have been required to be clean shaven, or have been disciplined for
attending events where alcoholic beverages were served.' 10 The differences
in the intensity of the privacy invasion are clear.
c. A Summary of the Schaill Court's Balancing Test
The Schaill court concluded its diminished expectation of privacy argu-
ment along the lines of "constructive notice" reasoning.'' The court's
premise was that athletes live a high visibility existence and since everyone
knows that professional and Olympic athletes get tested for drugs, all ath-
letes are on constructive notice that they too may be tested." 2 Hence, the
court reasoned that all these factors combined to diminish the participant's
privacy expectations to the point that any legitimate school interest would
outweigh them.
Not surprisingly, the court then found substantial governmental interests
in deterring and eliminating the drug problem in schools. 113 Specifically, the
court noted that the district court had found that approximately sixty per-
cent of Indiana high school students had tried marijuana, and that it was a
reasonable inference that the athletes in the TSC district fit the same pro-
file." 4 The issue also arose as to whether TSC officials would be required to
disclose the results of positive drug tests to law enforcement officials under
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1318 n.9.
110. Id.
111. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1319.
112. Id. The court acknowledges, however, that it would be improper to endorse testing all
students attending a school, and that it would not imply that testing of athletes would lead to
testing of students involved in other extra-curricular activities. Id. at 1319 n.10.
113. Id. at 1320.
114. Id. One should question, however, whether this is a truly reasonable inference.
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Indiana law." 15 While the school stated that it had no intention of using the
program as a criminal prosecution mechanism, the court implied that noth-
ing could prevent such a use of the program and that the issue could be
raised later if that came to be the program's use."16
d. Due Process Concerns
The court concluded its constitutional evaluation by examining Schaill's
challenge on due process grounds. Schaill claimed that the procedures of-
fered to challenge a positive result were insufficient on due process
grounds." 7 However, the court found that any liberty interest was not in-
fringed because the stigma attached to being removed from an athletic team
was minimal, stating, "[I]t is highly speculative to assume that the reasons
for a student's suspension from athletic competition will become general
knowledge, and that the student's reputation will be adversely affected by a
suspension."" 18 Statements such as this one offer evidence of the skewed and
unrealistic approach of some courts to drug testing programs.' '9
The court ultimately weighed the privacy and governmental interests and
found in favor of permitting the drug testing program. 120 Schaill, while dif-
fering from many cases in that it took place in a high school context, pro-
vides significant insight into how a court may twist the proper constitutional
inquiry.
e. A Plausible Extension of the Schaill Court's Logic
The court's reasoning is ambiguous, as indicated by its extensive and inco-
herent analysis of the many factors that it claims diminish the athletes' ex-
pectations of privacy. One may consider the following scenario as an
extension of the Schaill court's logic. Given the court's ad hoc clustering of
factors in its reasonableness analysis, it is not unthinkable that TSC could
implement a program to test all cheerleaders' urine samples to determine
birth control pill use.
For example, assume that a cheerleader became pregnant during the past
year. The school could state that it was interested in the health and safety of
its students, just as in the drug testing scenario, and that it wanted to dis-
courage promiscuous behavior and provide additional sexual counseling con-
115. See Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1322 n.18.
116. Id. Such a prospect obviously raises further privacy concerns, and perhaps offers the
opportunity to challenge the urinalysis program on terms more related to criminal search and
seizure contexts where probable cause and warrant requirements are not as easily excused.
117. Id. at 1323. The court explained the procedures as follows: "[Tihe athletic director
will inform a student and his or her parent or guardian of a positive test result which has been
confirmed .... The student and parent or guardian then have the opportunity to have a
reserved portion of the specimen retested at a laboratory of their choice." Id.
118. Id.
119. See Craig Neff, Bosworth Faces the Music, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 5, 1987, at 24
(a recent example of why the court's reasoning is improper).
120. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1324.
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cerning AIDS to any girls found to be taking birth control pills. 1 21 Given
the current abortion debate and the variety of proposed or enacted laws re-
quiring parental consent to perform abortions on women under eighteen, the
proposed scenario is alarmingly plausible.
But what makes this scenario even more plausible is the fact that the
Schaill court bypasses the Fourth Amendment requirements of probable
cause or individualized suspicion and leaps immediately into a reasonable-
ness inquiry, judged under all the circumstances of the situation. The
Supreme Court has made it clear that only in very limited circumstances will
it excuse the requirement of individualized suspicion. 122 After the Court's
decisions in Skinner and Von Raab, it is obvious that one may not assume
that a program is to be examined only under reasonableness standards.
Hence, it seems unlikely that Schaill would be upheld under present
standards.
3. Bally v. Northeastern University 123
In Bally, a member of the varsity track team brought a state-based claim
against Northeastern University because he had been declared ineligible due
to his refusal to sign both Northeastern's and the NCAA's drug testing con-
sent form for the 1987-88 season.1 24 Northeastern's testing program re-
quired both regular and post-season urinalysis, and any varsity athlete at
Northeastern was also subject to NCAA testing in post-season competition.
The actual test used by Northeastern required a monitor of the same sex to
visually observe the specimen being given. Any sample testing positive for
enumerated substances 25 required the suspension of the athlete from the
team. '
2 6
Bally's challenge alleged that forcing student athletes to consent to drug
testing in order to participate in sports: (1) violated their civil rights under
Massachusetts law; (2) violated their right to privacy under Massachusetts
law; and (3) constituted a breach of contract.127 Since Northeastern is a
private university, Bally did not attempt to bring a Fourth Amendment
claim, requiring a showing of state action. The superior court judge hearing
121. This author suggests that such a possibility is no more unreasonable than justifying
random urinalysis by a comparison to a prohibition on facial hair.
122. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
123. 403 Mass. 713, 532 N.E.2d 49 (1989). The action was remanded to state court after
Bally attempted to bring the action in federal district court and the court remanded for lack of
jurisdiction. See Bally v. NCAA, 707 F. Supp. 57 (D. Mass. 1988).
124. See Todd A. Leeson, The Drug Testing of College Athletes, 16 J.C. & U.L. 325, 330
(1989) (noting that Hill and Bally were the only two state-based attacks on drug testing up to
the time of the article).
125. Northeastern tested for amphetamines, barbituates, benzodiazepine, cannabinoid, co-
caine, methaqualone, opiates, phencyclidine, anabolic steriods, and testosterone. Id.
126. Id. The reasons given by the university for this type of program were: (1) to promote
health and safety; (2) to promote fair competition; and (3) to assure that student athletes are
not viewed as drug-users and that they do not tarnish the school's reputation. Id.
127. Id. (Massachusetts Supreme Court ignored the breach of contract claim); LeRoy
Pernell, Drug Testing of Student Athletes: Some Contract and Tort Implications, 67 DENy. U.




the matter granted summary judgment for Bally on the privacy and civil
rights claims but granted summary judgment for Northeastern on the con-
tractual issue. 128 Northeastern appealed and the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts reversed, finding no civil rights or privacy violations based on
state law. 129
a. The Civil Rights Claim
The court first analyzed a possible claim under the Massachusetts Civil
Rights Act.130 The court noted that the Civil Rights Act was intended to
provide a remedy for victims of racial or sexual harassment and not to create
a vast constitutional tort.131 The type of claim alleged required proof that
rights guaranteed by the United States or Massachusetts were interfered
with or one had attempted to interfere with them by "threats, intimidation,
or coercion."' 132 The court held that Bally's claim fell short due to a lack of
proof of "threats, intimidation, or coercion."' 33 The court noted a meritori-
ous claim on such a cause of action would require that the activity be di-
rected at a particular person or class of persons.1' 4 The court offered
illustrations of the type of activity required to state a civil rights claim, such
as a woman who was physically and verbally harassed, in a sexual manner,
by her employer.135 The basic element of a civil rights claim in Massachu-
setts appears to be physical confrontation or a substantial threat of harm.136
The court stated of Bally's claim and of Northeastern's drug testing pro-
gram, "Northeastern is conditioning Bally's intercollegiate athletic partici-
pation on consent to drug testing by urinalysis. It is indiscriminate,
impartially administered testing, and is not comparable with the direct as-
sault found in cases where we have granted relief under the Massachusetts
Civil Rights Act."' 137 In Bally's situation, the court felt he set forth no indi-
vidualized threat nor any threat of serious harm.138 It seems reasonable that
the type of injury alleged by Bally is not cognizable under a civil rights act.
The coercion present in Bally's situation is of a more subtle nature and is not
generally recognized in a civil rights context.
b. The Privacy Issue
Turning to the privacy issue, the court stated that most of its opinions
regarding privacy involved public dissemination of information and Bally
did not allege any such disclosure. 139 For example, the court cited a case
128. Bally, 532 N.E.2d at 50.
129. Id.
130. Id.; see MASS. GEN. L. ch. 12, § IllI (1989).
131. Bally, 532 N.E.2d at 52.
132. Id. (quoting MASS. GEN. L. ch. 12, § II H (1989)).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.; see O'Connell v. Chasdi, 400 Mass. 686, 687-88, 511 N.E.2d 349 (1987).
136. See, e.g., Bally, 532 N.E,2d at 52.
137. Id. at 53.
138. Id.
139. Id. The relevant privacy section of the Massachusetts law at issue states: "A person
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raising cognizable privacy concerns in which a doctor divulged confidential
patient information .4° Why the court has chosen this obviously narrow
construction of Massachusetts privacy law is unclear, but it appears likely
that the pertinent provision of Massachusetts law could be construed to pro-
vide broader protections. For example, the court noted that it refused to
decide whether the privacy statute protects against attempted interference
with a person's privacy. 141 Such a narrow reading of state privacy law is not
realistic given the litany of personal invasions that can occur today.
c. The Questions Left Unanswered by the Court's Analysis
Massachusetts apparently interprets its privacy statute to provide protec-
tion more akin to a tortious interference of privacy claim rather than one
related to a Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. While that may be
the drafters' intentions, the court's analysis only confuses the issue by failing
to decide whether Massachusett's law offers any explicit privacy protections
regarding constitutional invasions of privacy. This skewed analysis makes
the case useless as a reliable authority with respect to the privacy concerns
implicated by a drug testing program.
While one may infer that the Bally decision implies that no state protec-
tion against unreasonable searches is present in Massachusetts, the answer is
not clear. As one scholar has noted, however, this case is important because
it offers evidence of a limitation in bringing a state-based challenge to drug
testing: states may choose to construe their laws in a unique way even
though their constitutional provisions are nearly identical to those of an-
other state.' 4 2 Hence, while one may feel more certain as to how a federal
court will conduct a Fourth Amendment analysis, or as to how a state court
that has previously addressed a drug testing case may handle the issue, there
are no guarantees as to how a state court will interpret the language of its
constitution when first addressing such an issue.
B. MORE CURRENT AND SUCCESSFUL CHALLENGES
1. Brooks v. East Chambers Consolidated Independent School District, 43
In Brooks, high school students brought a class action suit in which they
sought to prove the school district's drug testing program for grades six
through twelve violated their federal constitutional rights.'" This suit was
different from others in that the plaintiff was not a student athlete but rather
a member of the high school's Future Farmers of America program, who
sought to obtain a temporary restraining order to prevent his exclusion from
shall have a right against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with his privacy."
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 214, § 18 (1989).
140. Bally, 532 N.E.2d at 53; see Tower v. Hirschhorn, 397 Mass. 581, 588, 492 N.E.2d
728, 731 (1986).
141. Bally, 532 N.E.2d at 54 n.5.
142. See Gibbs, infra note 190.
143. 730 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
144. Id. at 760. The school district approved the plan in 1988, which called for consent to
urinalysis as a prerequisite to participation in extra-curricular activities.
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future competitions if he did not submit to a drug test. 145 The school district
had adopted the program based on the recommendations of a few parents
and some random inquiries made by the principal of East Chambers High
School. 146
a. The Testing Program
The court, in examining the program, noted that there was no evidence
that drugs or alcohol had caused any specific problems relating to extra-
curricular activities. The high school principal, in fact, testified that he had
only witnessed two events (involving alcohol) that disrupted activities in
seven years. 147 In fact, the court stated, "The school district evidently is
responding with its program to a perceived public demand that the schools
'do something' about the general societal problem of substance abuse."' 148
The testing program required that all fall participants be tested once at the
semester's start and then randomly throughout the school year, with about
thirty students per month being tested. 149 The court recognized that during
the past year only thirteen high school students did not participate in some
extra-curricular activity that would have subjected them to testing. 150 In
effect, the program was a means to allow the school district and principal to
test and retest nearly any student they chose. The actual testing procedures
involved summoning the students from class to the principal's office, with no
effort made to disguise which students would be tested.' 15 The student was
confronted by the principal and school nurse about his or her drug use and
then led to the bathroom to provide the sample alone. The water in the
toilet, however, was colored to prevent adulteration of the sample.15 2 After
the student exited the bathroom, the nurse felt the container for proper
145. On the day the suit was filed, the plaintiff was requested to submit to a drug test and
was barred from participation after his refusal. Subsequently, an order restrained the school
district from barring him until a preliminary injunction hearing could be held.
146. The program was supposedly adopted because:
(1) "Student athletes ... are respected and admired by a large segment of the
student body and ... are expected to hold themselves as good examples of con-
duct, sportsmanship and training ...."
(2) "It has been widely recognized that using drugs and alcohol can cause seri-
ous... harm."
(3) "A student who uses drugs can be a danger to himself, his teammates or
opponents."
(4) "The schools . .. offer extra-curricular participation only to drug-free
students."
(5) "ECCCISD has a duty to protect the health and well-being of all its stu-
dents involved in extra-curricular activities," and
(6) "[E]xtra-curricular activities are .. .a privilege."
Id. at 761.
147. Id. The school district appeared to be paranoid about drug use. For example, they
had begun a drug-sniffing dog program, but were forced to discontinue it because the dogs
found so few drugs. Id.
148. Id.
149. Brooks, 730 F. Supp. at 761-62.
150. Id. at 761 n.l.




warmth.'13 Clearly, this testing procedure is one of the least intrusive, with
regard to procuring the specimen, that has been used in a drug testing
program.
b. The Federal Constitutionality Analysis
The Brooks court first examined the requisite element of "state action" in
its inquiry into the constitutionality of such a search, and quickly concluded
that a drug testing program implemented by a public school board consti-
tutes governmental action. The court then applied the Von Raab approach
to a Fourth Amendment analysis. First, the court examined the conduct
involved in the search and then the court judged this conduct against a rea-
sonableness standard. 154 The Brooks court noted that both the Fifth Circuit
and U.S. Supreme Court recognized that urinalysis intrudes upon reasonable
expectations of privacy and, thus, constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment. 55 The Brooks court then stated, "The test is a search regard-
less of whether the actual act of urination is observed, because the analysis of
urine is capable of disclosing facts about which an ordinary citizen has a
reasonable expectation of privacy."' 56 Hence, the East Chambers Consoli-
dated Independent School District (ECCISD) program spawned a Fourth
Amendment issue.1 7
The Brooks court then referred to the two-part inquiry announced in
TL.O. and analyzed the Fourth Amendment issue in similar terms: (1) was
the action appropriate from the inception, and (2) was the search reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances justifying the action initially. 5s This
appears to be the proper analysis required by the U.S. Supreme Court and
enunciated in Skinner and Von Raab; specifically stated, is the individualized
suspicion requirement waived and, if so, is the search reasonable? 159 The
court properly began its analysis by stating that generally the constitutional
test requires that the search of a student be based upon an individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing.160 Since the ECCISD test was not based upon
reasonable suspicion, the test could pass constitutional muster only by being
necessitated by a congruence of specific circumstances. 61
The court determined that the special circumstance the school district had
to show in this instance was that the extra-curricular participants were more
prone to drug use than other students.' 62 The court stated this would be
difficult to demonstrate since the participants are less likely to use drugs and
153. Id.
154. Brooks, 730 F. Supp. at 763; National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 679 (1989).
155. Brooks, 730 F. Supp. at 763.
156. Id.
157. Id. The court stated that the constitutionality of this drug testing program was a case
of first impression for the Southern District of Texas and the Fifth Circuit. Id.
158. Id. at 764; see supra note 27.
159. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.





alcohol because Texas law bars students who have poor grades from partici-
pating, and it follows logically that if students had substance abuse
problems, it would be indicated in their grades.' 63 Based on this rationale,
the court found the school district failed to demonstrate the compelling need
necessary to conduct the search without reasonable suspicion.164
Moreover, the court noted that all courts that have examined drug testing
of a general student group in public schools have found such programs un-
constitutional.165 Since the ECCISD program literally tested all students in
the school, the Brooks court pronounced it the most intrusive program of
any school district in Texas.166 Similarly, the court felt that the program
was unlikely to accomplish its stated goals of protecting the health and well-
being of students involved in extra-curricular activities.' 67 The court's big-
gest concern appeared to be with alcohol and the fact that testing for it
would not indicate its presence if the student had not ingested it within 24
hours. 168
c. The Court's Conclusions
The school district attempted to rely on Schaill.'69 The Brooks court,
however, announced that Schaill was probably no longer good law because
of the subsequent decisions in Skinner and Von Raab.170 The Brooks court
recognized that the interest in this case was far less than the compelling ones
in Skinner and Von Raab, and yet the interests in those cases were ques-
tioned as being insufficient.' 7' In the school context, no compelling interest
exists, like the protection of lives in Skinner, so the testing program is not
supported by the required compelling interest.' 72 Thus, the testing program
was judged unconstitutional, and a permanent injunction was granted to pre-
vent urine testing. "73 The Fifth Circuit endorsed the trial court's holding in
this matter by affirming the decision without opinion. ' 74 While this case
differs from some others in that it took place in a high school environment,
the opinion is quite logical and recognizes the significance of recent labor
cases in the drug testing area. Hence, its logic may prove persuasive to other
courts.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 765.
165. Brooks, 730 F. Supp. at 765.
166. Id. In fact, the court felt it could not even devise a more intrusive type of program.
167. One commentator believes that by expanding the program outside athletics, the school
diminished its purported justifications of protecting against the health and safety risks involved
in athletic competition. See Charles Feeney Knapp, Drug Testing and the Student-Athlete:
Meeting the Constitutional Challenge, 76 IOWA L. REV. 107, 131 (1990).
168. Brooks, 730 F. Supp. at 765.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 766.
171. Id.; see supra notes 33, 52-54 and accompanying text. The public safety interests in
those cases were far greater than any alleged interest in drug testing student athletes.
172. Brooks, 730 F. Supp. at 766.
173. Id.
174. Brooks, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991).
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2. Derdeyn v. University of Colorado, Boulder 175
In Derdeyn, student athletes sought to challenge the constitutionality of
the University of Colorado's drug testing program through a class action
suit.176 The method of challenge was based on a student athlete's right to be
free from unreasonable searches, privacy concerns, due process of law, and
equal protection. 177 The trial court found the program unconstitutional as
an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment and under Colorado
Constitution article II., section 7, and it found the consent required of stu-
dents to be invalid because it was coerced. 17 The appeal by Colorado was
based solely on the urinalysis program.179
a. The Appellate Court's Analysis
The appellate court's opinion tends to follow the recent and obviously
applicable case law in its analysis. After a quick notation that urinalysis has
been deemed a search under the Fourth Amendment, the court recognized
that state privacy concerns were implicated and that the drug testing pro-
gram is also a search under article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitu-
tion.180 The parties stipulated that as a state institution, any action
regarding the drug testing program constituted state action.' 8'
The court began its analysis by noting the proper level of inquiry under
the Supreme Court labor cases of Skinner and Von Raab. After looking to
the language of those decisions, the court determined that the University's
interest in preventing drug use could not rise to the compelling interest stan-
dard required in those cases.' 8 2 Rather, the court stated, "[T]here are no
public safety or law enforcement interests that are served by such sports
programs. Accordingly, we hold that the urine testing program here at issue
is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment."'' 8 3
Since the court recognized that the privacy protection under Colorado
article II., section 7 may be more expansive than the federal protection, the
court also concluded that the drug testing program violated the Colorado
Constitution. 1 4 The court also affirmed the trial court's finding on the co-
erced consent issue because, recognizing that student athletes had made eco-
nomic and other far-reaching commitments to the school, their choice with
175. 832 P.2d 1031, 1032 (Colo. App. 3d Div. 1991), cert. granted, (Colo. July 13, 1992).
176. Id. The university's purported goals appear to have been coextensive with those of the
NCAA program: (1) to prepare athletes for drug testing in NCAA sanctioned events; (2) a
concern for its athlete's health; (3) an interest in promoting its image; (4) to ensure fair compe-
tition. While the exact manner of testing varied slightly over several years, it generally in-
volved urine samples given under direct visual observation and testing was based on both
random sampling and reasonable suspicion. Id.
177. Id. at 1033.
178. Id.
179. Id. Rapid eye examinations involving reasonable suspicion were also part of the pro-
gram, but were not mentioned in the appeal.
180. Id. (court looked to the decisions in Skinner and Von Raab, among others).
181. Id.
182. Derdeyn, 832 P.2d at 1034-35.




regard to the consent forms was far from free and voluntary.18 5
From an overall perspective, this case represents the outcome one could
reasonably expect when a court looks to the pertinent standards set out in
Skinner and Von Raab. It is far more coherent than Bally and is likely to
carry far more precedential value because of its well-reasoned analysis.
b. The Court Upholds the Reasonable Suspicion Portion of the
Program
The court, however, dissolved the portion of the injunction preventing
drug testing based on probable cause. The court, citing the TL. 0. opinion,
stated that reasonable suspicion is a valid basis to conduct a search in many
situations. 8 6 Though the present university program failed to address ob-
jective criteria for conducting drug testing based on reasonable suspicion, the
court refused to rule out the possibility that a reasonable suspicion drug test-
ing program might be constitutionally permissible. Thus, the court affirmed
the injunction, except for the section stating all testing not based on probable
cause was unconstitutional.18 7 Derdeyn represents the most recent decision
on drug testing programs and one of the better opinions. The court looked
to the appropriate standards for analyzing such a program and properly rea-
soned that such programs should be based on individualized suspicion, un-
less a compelling interest exists like that in Skinner.
3. Hill v. NCAA 8 8
Hill is the most significant decision in the athletic drug testing area be-
cause it is the first real interpretation of NCAA drug testing data by a court
and also because the challenge is primarily based on a state constitutional
privacy protection, an avenue of challenge that is increasingly leading to new
success against the NCAA. 189 Hill is also an obvious illustration of the
chaos that has been created by the differing analyses by various courts, but it
offers the most thorough inquiry into the actual NCAA methods of drug
testing employed and the purported rationale for such testing.19 0
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Derdeyn, 832 P.2d at 1035-36. Specifically, the court reversed the portion of the in-
junction that prohibits all testing not based on probable cause.
188. 230 Cal. App. 3d 1714, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402 (6th Dist.), review granted, 276 Cal. Rptr.
319, 801 P.2d 1070 (Cal. Dec. 20, 1990).
189. See Leeson, supra note 124 (generally discussing several challenges to various pro-
grams, including early proceedings in the Hill case, and the Bally and O'Halloran decisions).
190. Hill, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1719; see also Annette Gibbs, Drug Testing and College
Athletes: Conflicts Among Institutions, Students, and the NCAA, 67 W. EDUC. L. REP. 1
(1991) (discussing Hill, Bally, and other important cases involving drug testing and further
investigating the justifications behind the programs. Gibbs is a Professor and the Director of
the Curry School's Center for the Study of Higher Education at the University of Virginia.
She examines the alternatives to the current NCAA program, citing the drug testing program
of the University of Montana, developed with the assistance of attorneys from the ACLU, as a
possible model. The changes made in that program include only testing randomly for a few
performance-enhancing drugs, testing for street drugs only upon a finding of probable cause,
and giving athletes the choice of unobserved specimen collection).
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In Hill, the Sixth District of the California Court of Appeals affirmed a
permanent injunction against the NCAA, which had been granted by the
Santa Clara Superior Court, and which prohibited enforcement of the
NCAA drug testing program against Stanford athletes.191 Though origi-
nally brought by diver Simone LeVant, who subsequently graduated from
Stanford, the current plaintiffs, Jennifer Hill, co-captain of the women's soc-
cer team during her senior year, and J. Barry McKeever, a linebacker on the
football team, both had signed the NCAA consent forms for the 1986-87
school year but did not wish to do so again and wanted the injunction to
apply to the 1987-88 season. 192 Hence, they sought declaratory and injunc-
tive relief against the NCAA. 193 The violations alleged included unlawful
search and seizure under article I of the California Constitution and due
process violations. 194
The plaintiffs stated the NCAA tests are, "'degrading, humiliating, and
embarrassing,' that the tests are incapable of measuring factors relevant to
athletic performance, that there are, in fact, no drugs which enhance athletic
performance, and that the program required no showing of individualized
suspicion, probable cause, or compelling necessity."' 195 The plaintiffs relied
solely on the unconstitutional privacy violation claim in the injunctive
proceedings. 196
a. Privacy, the NCAA, and the California Constitution
The NCAA is a voluntary, private association and has been determined
not to be a state actor. 197 Therefore, claims under the traditional Fourth
Amendment analysis failed because the required "state action" was not pres-
ent.198 However, since this action was based on the California Constitution,
article I, section 1, state action was not required because that section pro-
tects California citizens from both governmental and nongovernmental con-
191. Hill, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1752.
192. Id. at 1722.
193. Id. at 1721.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1722; but c.f Michael Janofsky, Track and Field: Complex Issues Arise in Steri-
ods Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1989, at 51, Col. 5 (discussing Charlie Francis's testimony
where, as Ben Johnson's former coach, he described Johnson's use of the drug and noted how
the steroids contributed to performance enhancement); Patricia Loverock, The Athlete of the
Future, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1989, Magazine, at 12 (noting that the Soviets found steroids
effective for building bigger, stronger muscles).
196. Hill, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1721. Barry McKeever had also made a claim, in addition
to the privacy violation, of negligent interference with economic relations. Id. While the court
does not address this economic claim, future challenges may be made on this basis given the
unprecedented money available to professional athletes and the obvious relationship in most
sports between college athletic success and a professional sports career. Furthermore, athletics
had an economic influence on McKeever's attendance at Stanford, since he attended Stanford
on a full athletic scholarship and could not have afforded Stanford without it. Id. at 1722.
197. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988). The U.S.
Supreme Court found that although the University of Nevada-Las Vegas was clearly a state
actor, the NCAA was an association of public and private institutions and that the NCAA's
regulatory function was not state action even if a state institution enforces the NCAA's
regulations.
198. See Gibbs, supra note 190, at 3.
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duct. 199 Section I provides: "All people are by nature free and independent
and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life
and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." 200 Recent California case law has
interpreted the state constitutional privacy right conferred to be equivalent
with other fundamental rights more traditionally acknowledged as being
protected under the U.S. Constitution, e.g., the right to defend life.
20 1
b. The Necessity of a Compelling Interest
The NCAA argued that privacy guarantees under California law must be
balanced against the interests and needs of the NCAA, here, the disclosure
of drug testing results.20 2 The NCAA refused to recognize that the privacy
protections offered by the California Constitution were greater than those
afforded by the Fourth Amendment, instead regarding the proper test to be
the measure between the degree of the government's interest and the extent
of the personal intrusion. Such a test implies that the NCAA believes that
the court should find that the only inquiry required is one of reasonableness
under all the circumstances. This was the analysis under Schaill, but as the
Brooks court noted, such an analysis is no longer proper. 20 3
The Hill court, however, noted a distinction between the criminal and
noncriminal search context. Specifically, the court stated that Fourth
Amendment search and seizure protections and California constitutional
privacy protections are "coextensive" only with regard to police activity in a
criminal context. 2° 4
The court then properly looked to Skinner for guidance outside the crimi-
nal context, recalling that the Fourth Amendment only affects unreasonable
search and seizures: Skinner involves balancing the government's interests
with the particular intrusion. 20 5 In cases outside normal law enforcement
activities, the Hill court recognized that departures from normal warrant
and probable cause requirements may be justified by the situation. 20 6 How-
ever, the Hill court took note of two important facts raised by Skinner in
approving the testing of railroad employees involved in accidents: (1) the
urine sample was not furnished under direct visual observation, thus limiting
199. Hill, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1725.
200. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
201. See Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1, 15, 267 Cal.Rptr. 618,
629-30 (1st Dist.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 344 (1990) (court concluded the employer had not
demonstrated a sufficient interest to justify testing "office employees" whose jobs did not impli-
cate any safety concerns).
202. Hill, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1725. See also David A. Cathcart, Drug and Alcohol Policies
and Testing Programs-A Review of Significant Issues, C588 A.L.I.- A.B.A. 319 (1991) (re-
viewing the significant issues in Hill and noting other states with express constitutional protec-
tions of privacy).
203. Hill, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1725-26; see supra notes 170-172 and accompanying text.
204. Hill, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1726.
205. Id.; Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
206. Hill, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1726. The court in Hill noted that the basis of the departure
from warrant and probable cause requirements in Skinner was the necessity of protecting the
public from rail accidents.
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the intrusion of privacy, and (2) the employees expectations of privacy were
significantly less in such a heavily regulated industry.
20 7
Furthermore, the Hill court acknowledged the Von Raab decision and
stated that the suspicionless drug testing of Customs employees and border
officers in certain groups had been carefully considered by the Supreme
Court.20 8 The Court only upheld the testing in Von Raab because the "com-
pelling interest" in protecting the national borders outweighed the employ-
ees' privacy expectations, which clearly had to be diminished given the type
of job being performed. 2° 9 The Hill court attempted to follow the NCAA's
logic that the Skinner justifications should be applied in this case. Such an
argument assumed that the athletes' expectation of privacy was reduced be-
cause of their extensive regulation in other respects, that the NCAA's con-
cern with health and safety was substantial, and that allowing such testing
would deter drug use and outweigh any intrusion.210
The Hill court also recognized that the plaintiff's claims in this case rested
on California constitutional protections, not the Fourth Amendment. 211
This fact evidences the primary difference from some other drug testing
analyses, because, as the court stated:
"California courts deciding claims under article I, section 1, require the
state to show a compelling interest before it can invade a fundamental
privacy right . . . ." This test places a heavier burden on [the propo-
nent] than would a Fourth Amendment privacy analysis, in which the
permissibility of a particular practice is judged by balancing its intru-
sion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promo-
tion of legitimate governmental interests. '2 12
Thus, the Hill court noted the different balancing test required in article I,
section 1 cases, as distinguished from Fourth Amendment cases. The degree
of governmental interest required in such cases is not just a rational relation-
ship to a legitimate goal but rather a compelling state interest: it must be
necessary in order to accomplish a state goal.2 13
c. The Compelling Interest Test
The NCAA program required that its members, such as Stanford Univer-
sity, force athletes like Hill and McKeever to submit to drug testing or be
barred from competing.214 The Hill court determined that to uphold the
drug testing program, the NCAA must show: "(1) the testing program re-
207. Hill, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1726-27.
208. Id. at 1727.
209. Id.
210. Id. The court recognized the NCAA was relying on Schaill, where that court had
found the high school athletes' expectations of privacy reduced by other forms of regulation
they endured and by the desire to prevent great harm to the students. Id.; Schaill, 864 F.2d at
1318-20.
211. Hill, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1728.
212. Id.; see also Luck, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 20.
213. Hill, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1728. In this sense, the court's inquiry differs from a Fourth
Amendment determination of whether probable cause may be overlooked and, instead, a rea-




lates to the purposes of the NCAA regulations which confer the benefit (par-
ticipation in intercollegiate competition); (2) the utility of imposing the
program manifestly outweighs any resulting impairment of the constitu-
tional right; and (3) there are no less offensive alternatives.1 21 5 To deter-
mine whether the NCAA program met that test, the Hill court undertook an
extensive examination of the purposes and methods involved in the NCAA
program.
d. The Purported NCAA Justifications
The NCAA asserted that many athletes felt that drugs enhanced their
performance and that other athletes felt compelled to take drugs to maintain
their competitive edge.216 Furthermore, the NCAA stated that the drugs
caused a health risk to the athletes taking them as well as to other partici-
pants, and that street drugs affected the integrity of NCAA sports since
those students were more likely to become embroiled in gambling, point
shaving, and bribery.217 Even though the NCAA's own drug testing com-
mittee had recommended against the use of a drug testing program devel-
oped and administered by the NCAA, the NCAA adopted such a drug
testing program in 1986.218 To outline how the program generally works,
the testing in most sports is done at NCAA championships where athletes
are picked and told to report to give a specimen within an hour after partici-
pating in an event; as of August 1, 1990, the NCAA and many athletic con-
ferences have implemented a second requirement that participants in some
programs may now be required to submit to a test at any time during the
academic year.219 In the Hill case, the NCAA presented extensive evidence
that detailed its testing program. Six categories of drugs were banned in-
cluding psychomotor and nervous system stimulants, sympathomimetic
amines, anabolic steroids, beta blockers and alcohol in rifle sports, diuretics,
and street drugs. 220 As of the time of trial, the NCAA's list of banned sub-
stances constituted fifty-eight single-spaced printed pages and was labelled,
"THIS IS NOT CONSIDERED A COMPLETE LIST! RELATED SUB-
215. Id. at 1728-29.
216. Id. at 1729.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See Gibbs, supra note 190; see also NCAA NEWS, May 23, 1990, at 1 (noting the
recent changes in the NCAA program).
220. The Hill court detailed the evidence and described the types of drugs in each category:
CATEGORY 1 (psychomotor and nervous system drugs) includes amphetamines, cocaine,
crack, caffeine. This requires coffee, tea, and caffeinated soft-drinks to be declared.
CATEGORY 2 (sympathomimetic amines) was eliminated by 1989-90. The category had in-
cluded allergy pills, cold tablets, and cough syrups.
CATEGORY 3 (anabolic steroids) includes nandralone, stanozolol, and testosterone.
CATEGORY 4 (beta blockers and alcohol) only involves rifle sports and drugs which slow the
heart beat.
CATEGORY 5 (diuretics) includes any type of this drug which increases weight loss or dilutes
urine.
CATEGORY 6 (street drugs) includes amphetamine, cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and
methamphetamine.
Hill, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1731.
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STANCES ARE BANNED!"' 221 The actual NCAA prohibition only in-
volved student athletes who tested positive for a banned substance used "in
preparation for or participation in an NCAA championship or certified post-
season football contest. '222 Whether or not the athlete used the drugs was
irrelevant. The court noted that students who admitted to drug use were not
barred if their urinalysis is negative, nor were they barred if the school's
drug test was positive and the NCAA's was negative. 223
e. NCAA Findings
The trial court in this case found that the NCAA's own evidence sup-
ported the position that a minuscule amount of drug use by NCAA athletes
took place, and the court stated that the student athletes actually used drugs
far less than their peers.224 In fact, the trial court felt the testing indicated
"remarkably little drug use by student athletes involved in NCAA competi-
tion."' 225 The NCAA attempted to rely on anecdotal testimony at trial, but
most of it involved international athletics, contained hearsay difficulties and
was labelled untrustworthy by the court.226 Though this Comment does not
strive to examine fully the technical merit of the testing procedures involved
in the NCAA program, the Hill court also stated that many of the positive
marijuana tests were unreliable because they came from one particular lab
that provided no concentration levels so that the positives could be obtained
without actually smoking marijuana.227
The court also appeared to conclude that such drug testing is relatively
useless to determine steroid use, clearly the most prevalent drug used by
student athletes, because water-based steroids clear the athlete's system in a
few days and the NCAA's testing program would probably not detect their
use.228 Thus, the Hill court found many of the NCAA's justifications and
methods lacking. The NCAA failed to demonstrate the necessary relation-
ship between the progam and its stated purposes, as is required under the
first level of the compelling interest test.
f. The Court's Balancing Test
The court, however, continued its analysis under the second part. of the
compelling interest test, which requires a decision as to (1) whether the
NCAA program invades a protected constitutional interest, and (2) whether
221. Id. at 1730.
222. Id. at 1732.
223. Id.
224. Id. First, no women athletes in any sport had tested positive and been barred from
competition under the NCAA program. In 1986-87, less than one percent of the approxi-
mately 3500 athletes tested yielded positive results and most of that one percent involved foot-
ball. In 1987-88, approximately 1600 athletes were tested (presumably those the NCAA felt
most likely to catch) and only 1.3% tested positive. Id.
225. Hill, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1732.
226. Id. at 1733.
227. Id. at 1734.
228. Id. at 1735.
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the benefit of the program exceeds the intrusion. 229 The plaintiffs raised four
privacy concerns: (1) visual observation of urination is embarrassing and de-
grading; (2) the program interferes with medical confidentiality; (3) the pro-
gram interferes with medical assistance; and (4) the NCAA is attempting to
control athletes' activity off the playing field. 230
The court described the embarrassing procedure at issue as follows:
Subjects are required to disrobe from the area of their armpits to their
knees, exposing their genitals, and to produce a urine specimen of at
least 100 milliliters while under visual observation. If a subject is un-
able to "fill the beaker," he or she is given fluids and required to remain
under the observation of the NCAA validatory until successful. 231
The court then recognized that urinalysis is an activity protected under the
privacy aspects of article I, section 1, and stated that visual or aural monitor-
ing of urination automatically raises privacy issues. 232
The court then examined California law to determine the breadth of the
privacy interest concerned. It noted prior California holdings indicating
that procreative choice is a fundamental right that is invaded by requiring
women to declare the use of birth control pills, that the right to control one's
own medical treatment was also protected, and finally, that the right to pri-
vacy is generally broad and allows protection of one's medical history and
related concerns. 233 Thus, the court determined that the NCAA program
invaded the state constitutional privacy interest that is essential to other con-
stitutional protections and that requires a compelling public need in order to
be compromised. 234 Therefore, the NCAA had to provide a compelling
need to interfere with such an interest.
g. A Strict Evaluation of the NCAA Justifications
The NCAA set forth two basic reasons that its testing program was neces-
sary: (1) to protect the health and safety of student athletes, and (2) to pre-
serve fair competition. Just as the trial court had concluded earlier, the Hill
court found that no evidence had been set forth to show that drug use had
endangered NCAA athletes in competition, and the court further indicated
that almost all over-the-counter drugs, if misused, could cause as much
harm as most of the substances banned by the NCAA. 23 5 Specifically, the
229. Hill, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1737.
230. Id. at 1737-38.
231. Id. at 1720.
232. Id. at 1738 (The court recalled the Fifth Circuit's language in Von Raab, which de-
scribed urination as an action that is performed without observation under tradition and social
custom).
233. Id. at 1738-39.
234. Id. at 1739.
235. Id. at 1740. Though tragic, the deaths of Len Bias and Don Rogers, the two most
notable athletes whose deaths were linked to drug use, did not occur in connection with ath-
letic competition. Their drug use raises societal concerns for young adults in general rather
than student athletes specifically. See infra note 244; Tom Callahan, An Empty Dream: Len
Bias Dies at 22, TIME, June 30, 1986, at 73; Mark Gladstone & Mark Heister, Cause of NFL
Player's Death In Sacramento Is To Be Determined; He Was To Be Married Today, L.A.
TIMEs, June 28, 1986, at 2, Col. 4.
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court stated that "there was no evidence that any student athlete had ever
injured anyone else as a result of drug use. Unlike pilots and railroad work-
ers, athletes are not responsible for the safety of others. 236
From a broader perspective, the Hill court appeared swayed that the
NCAA did not truly have athletes' health in mind when they began their
drug testing program, but rather that the NCAA sought to control the ath-
letes' behavior, on and off the playing field. For example, the NCAA did not
require measles vaccinations to participate in competition, even though mea-
sles outbreaks had occurred at several NCAA events, and the court noted
that the NCAA's justification for this position was that student athletes and
other college students should not be treated differently. 237 Furthermore, the
evidence indicated that doctors often did not prescribe appropriate medica-
tion due to the NCAA regulations. In examining the list of banned sub-
stances, one can see that most listed drugs are approved by the FDA and are
intended to revive the immune system.238
The NCAA also did not ban alcohol, except in rifle sports, and it did not
ban cigarette smoking, both of which have a much greater overall negative
health effect than the banned substances. 239 Finally, no rehabilitation or
assistance was offered to any athlete regardless of whether he tested positive
or not, even though the NCAA admitted that such treatment was essential
to any program.24° It is obvious that the court found the health and safety
justifications lacking.
Next, the court turned to the NCAA's fair competition argument.241
Both the NCAA's special drug committee and the trial court found insuffi-
cient evidence to indicate that any banned substances enhanced competitive
athletic performance. 242 In fact, the court found the likelihood of decreased
performance due to loss of concentration and trembling just as realistic a
scenario. 243 Also, street drugs have garnered the most media attention re-
garding abuse in several publicized deaths,244 yet the trial court clearly de-
termined that drugs like cocaine and marijuana impair athletic
performance. 245 The court noted that even if drugs did enhance perform-
ance, the NCAA's testing program would not detect much of the claimed
236. Hill, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1740.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1740-41.
240. Id. at 1741.
241. Id.
242. Hill, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1741. Members of various NCAA drug committees testified
no substance on the NCAA list had been shown to consistently increase the student athlete's
performance in competition and that any of the drugs could hinder or improve athletic per-
formance no more than is due to normal physiological changes. Steroids are generally consid-
ered the most effective drug to build body mass and strength but another physician and
clinician testified that there was no hard scientific evidence to substantiate the claim that ster-
oids consistently enhanced performance. Id. at 1741-42.
243. Id. at 1742.
244. The most publicized drug-related tragedy of a student athlete is that of Len Bias, the
University of Maryland basketball star who died of a cocaine overdose. See John Leo, How
Cocaine Killed Leonard Bias, TIME, July 7, 1986, at 52.
245. Hill, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1743.
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use. For example, steroids would be used during training in the pre-season
and would not show up in post-season drug tests.246 Thus, the court con-
cluded that the NCAA testing program failed to accomplish its supposed
purpose in preserving equitable competition. 247
h. Alternatives
The third part of the compelling interest test required the NCAA to show
that no less offensive alternatives existed that furthered the program's pur-
ported goals. 248 Both the trial and appellate courts involved in this case
found that the NCAA program failed this test.249 First, the NCAA's use of
drug education was literally nonexistent. 250 The court's statements about
the effects of an education program are compelling. The court noted:
The NCAA witnesses have testified that even if drugs do not enhance
performance, some athletes think they do. This is exactly the type of
problem that is best addressed by an educational program rather than
by punitive testing. Drug education is effective in destroying the myths
concerning drugs in sports .... A successful drug education program
would also deter drug use at all times, unlike the NCAA drug testing
program which only deters use near postseason events. 251
The court continued, "Effective drug education which teaches athletes to
deal with the stress and underlying causes for drug use is more appropriate
for educational institutions than the NCAA's drug testing program which
only teaches athletes to 'say no' to drugs only when they believe they may be
caught. '252 Hence, the drug testing program failed the third constitutional
requirement in that reasonable alternatives existed to the unnecessarily in-
trusive program.253
i. The Hill Court's Conclusions
The court recommended that the NCAA examine testing based upon rea-
sonable suspicion.254 The court recognized that substances like steroids pro-
duce unmistakable characteristics that are easily recognized by trainers and
coaches, and that other organizations, like the NBA, rely on reasonable sus-
picion testing.255 The court also determined that the NCAA drug testing
246. Id. at 1744.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1728-29, 1745.
249. Id. at 1745.
250. From 1975-85, the NCAA spent about $200,000 dollars on drug education, with the
extent of the education consisting of a brochure and posters; in 1986-87, the NCAA spent
more than one million dollars on drug testing. Id
251. Hill, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1745.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1747.
254. Id. at 1746.
255. Id. For an illustration of how drug abuse usually is obvious, examine the case of Roy
Tarpley and his experience with the Dallas Mavericks. Clearly the symptoms of serious drug
use are difficult to disguise, and drug use resulted in the loss of Tarpley's career in the NBA.
Perhaps education could have done more for Tarpley at an earlier stage in life. The threat of a
drug testing program, even one based on reasonable suspicion, was clearly not enough to deter
Tarpley's drug use since it is hard to think of a greater deterrence than losing a multi-million
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program was overbroad and unnecessarily inclusive. 256 By using the words
"and related compounds" the NCAA could claim innumerable substances fit
within its list of banned substances. 257 Furthermore, the court concluded
that the NCAA could not force student athletes to waive their right to pri-
vacy guaranteed under the California constitution in order to participate in
NCAA sanctioned events. 258 By conducting a thorough examination of the
NCAA's justifications, and by properly applying the compelling interest test,
the Hill court reached the same conclusion that the Derdeyn court did: the
NCAA should base its testing program on reasonable suspicion of drug
use.
259
j. Recent Developments in the Hill Case
The Hill case is presently before the California Supreme Court, and the
decision may have long term ramifications by influencing the decisions of
similarly situated states. In their briefs to the California Supreme Court, the
plaintiffs, Hill and McKeever, appear to have the better-reasoned position.
The NCAA's arguments are misplaced because they ignore the fact that the
NCAA is not a state actor.26° The NCAA also argues that the compelling
interest test is not the proper standard by which to judge its drug testing
program, and that California's right of privacy does not apply to private
actors.
26 1
Hill and McKeever's position is more logical because their position recog-
nizes: (1) that when the California electorate passed the privacy initiative
through a vote, it affirmed the legislative intent that privacy be treated equiv-
alently with other fundamental rights and that those rights should yield only
to a compelling public need; and (2) that the initiative directly applied to
non-governmental actors and that California courts had interpreted it as
such.
2 6 2
Moreover, Hill and McKeever demonstrate that the NCAA's argument
dollar contract to play professional basketball. See Tarpley: Stardom Brought Drugs Pro Bas-
ketball: Banned NBA Player Says Money and Freedom Led Him to Cocaine Addiction, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 1992, SC, at 6. (stating that Tarpley was ill-prepared to handle the money and
lifestyle the NBA offered).
256. Hill, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1746.
257. Id. 1747.
258. Id Another potentially important aspect of the case involved the NCAA's argument
that prohibiting enforcement of the NCAA testing program against Stanford would violate the
commerce clause (art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3) of the U.S. Constitution. The NCAA claimed that such
an injunction would stop the NCAA from creating uniform rules for its competition. The Hill
court, stated, however, that the local benefit involved, the right to privacy, was of paramount
importance. Furthermore, the trial court stated that the NCAA had successfully conducted
championships for 80 years without drug testing. Id. at 1747-49.
259. Id. at 1746.
260. See Opening Brief of Petitioner, filed Feb. 21, 1991, at 13 (where the NCAA relies on
cases in which governmental interests were implicated and the application of a balancing test
was proper).
261. Id. at 12-19 (improperly attempting to rely on cases involving government actors and
the tests used in those cases); see Supplemental Brief of Petitioner, filed March 26, 1992, at 34
(NCAA utterly and completely ignores the legislative history relating to the state constitu-
tional right to privacy in California).
262. See Supplemental Reply Brief of Respondents, filed April 10, 1992, at 1-2, 6.
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that they had "notice" of the intrusions is irrelevant, stating, "The radical
proposition that a fundamental right can be lost as long as there is prior
notice is not supported by the cases and is anathema to basic constitutional
values."' 263 Similarly, they address the NCAA's "diminished expectations"
argument by recognizing that people who belong to health clubs also use
communal lockers and showers and that this everyday occurrence is not suf-
ficient to permit monitored urinalysis and disclosure of contraceptive and
medical information. 264 When the California Supreme Court correctly ap-
plies the law, they will find the NCAA program unconstitutional under the
California privacy guarantee.
IV. THE CASE FOR THE NCAA AND RELATED TESTING
PROGRAMS: DOES THE HARM OUTWEIGH THE
GOOD? WILL THE PROGRAM SURVIVE?
SHOULD IT?
A. AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE NCAA PROGRAM
1. Forrest Gregg's Background
The courts deciding drug testing matters are often placed in difficult posi-
tions because they may not fully understand the justifications set forth by the
NCAA and may not understand the players to the same degree as people
involved with athletics. Thus, it is important to acknowledge the views of
those working with student athletes to gain a better understanding of
whether dismissal of the NCAA's purported justifications is reasonable.
Forrest Gregg is clearly one of the most credible sources involved with both
collegiate and professional athletics. Currently, Gregg is director of athletics
at Southern Methodist University, a school riddled with NCAA difficulties
in the 1980s. These difficulties culminated in the first-ever death penalty for
SMU's football program, but the school has come full circle in its NCAA
compliance.
Gregg played collegiate football at SMU in the 1950s and then went on to
a fifteen year pro career, including two Super Bowl victories with the Green
Bay Packers. 265 After his playing career ended, Gregg continued his associ-
ation with football by coaching in the NFL for eleven years, earning both the
NFL and AFC coach-of-the-year honors. 266 After coaching SMU's football
program for two years, Gregg relinquished his duties to become the full-time
263. Id. at 15.
264. Id. at 19 (observing that the leap from communal lockers to urination in front of a
monitor is a "slippery slope" argument).
265. Fourteen of Gregg's seasons were spent as an offensive tackle with Green Bay, and
one season was spent with the Dallas Cowboys. The legendary Vince Lombardi called Gregg
"the finest player I have ever coached." Southern Methodist University Football Program at 8
(1991).
266. Id. Gregg coached the Green Bay Packers from 1984 to 1987, the Cincinnati Bengals
from 1980 to 1983, and Cleveland Browns from 1975 to 1977. He also coached the Toronto




athletic director at SMU, overseeing fifteen athletic teams.2 6 7
2. Forrest Gregg's Views on the NCAA Program
In a recent interview, Gregg offered his assessment of the NCAA drug
testing program.268 He stated of the program overall, "I think it's very good
for college athletics that we have it."' 269 He noted that participation in
NCAA athletics is voluntary and that he finds it is reasonable for the NCAA
to take measures to uphold the integrity of its program. 270 Moreover, Gregg
bluntly asserted, referring to those who refuse to test, "I have a message for
them, that if you don't want to take the test, then don't be in the NCAA and
don't be an athlete. 27
1
a. The NCAA Program and Its Benefits
On a general level, Gregg also sees little concern regarding the substances
tested for because all of the positive tests resulted from illegal substances in
the first place. 272 He responds to the argument that the NCAA has not
spent adequate funds on drug education by noting that student athletes are
not majoring in "drug education." He stated that SMU currently gets funds
from the Southwest Conference and the NCAA for drug education, with the
point of the program being to educate the students not to use drugs and not
to abuse legal substances like alcohol.273 In terms of what information a
typical football player receives about drugs at SMU, Gregg said that the
students are approached in a reasonable manner, and that coaches con-
stantly remind them of the pitfalls of drugs but attempt to avoid lecturing
them.274 With regard to doing more in the area of drug education he said,
"I feel that if we spent as much money on drug education as we do in testing,
students would have to major in drug education.1 275 However, Gregg ex-
pressed his fear of what is going on with drugs at the grade school level,
based on the information he receives from players and other sources, and he
believes that the early stages of school are a proper area in which to focus
current drug education programs, though he is unsure if the testing program
in the Brooks v. East Chambers situation is necessary. But he stated that if
his children were required to be tested in the sixth grade, related to any extra
curricular activity, he would have no problem with it. In fact he noted,
267. Id.
268. Interview with Forrest Gregg, Director of Athletics of Southern Methodist Univer-
sity, in Dallas, Tex. (Jan. 28, 1992).
269. Id.
270. Id. Gregg maintains that with such a premium placed on winning, young athletes are
easily influenced or convinced of assertions related to enhancing their performance. He also
believes in the danger of steroids and recognizes the dangers they pose to young athletes, since
from the viewpoint of his experience, they do enhance strength and mass build up. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. Gregg is unaware of any disciplinary action resulting from a positive based on
over-the-counter type drugs on the NCAA list and has no objection to including alcohol on the
list of banned substances for athletes.





"Some parents might learn a lot about their kids." 276
Moreover, with respect to the direct observation methods used in the
NCAA testing, Gregg stated that from his experience, "If you're going to do
a legal drug test, the only way is that it be observed. ' 277 As far as enhancing
performance, he recognized that steroids are the only performance enhanc-
ing drug, and he believes the evidence is clear that steroids do enhance per-
formance and that they are used by athletes in several sports.278 Also,
steroids are clearly the most appealing drug to football players for several
reasons. In a typical scenario, Gregg stated that a young player who weighs
230 pounds is told by the coach he must weigh 270 if he wants a starting
position. He can eat a great deal and lift weights, but steriods assure him he
can build muscle quicker. Furthermore, a secondary effect of steroids is in-
creased aggressiveness and Gregg notes that every football coach looks for
more aggressive players. Gregg also stated that steroids are the primary
drug that testers are looking for, even though many other substances are on
the NCAA list.279
b. The Necessity of the NCAA
Since the NCAA's role has been heavily debated in many contexts, espe-
cially with regard to its status as a non-state actor based on the Tarkanian
decision, the power it exerts in drug testing is an obvious area of criticism by
many schools and in many legal challenges. But Gregg is convinced that a
watchdog is necessary to regulate the competition because, with such a pre-
mium placed on winning programs, the temptation to enhance performance
is immense. 280 Another fact that may be surprising to many is that Gregg is
impressed by the manner in which NCAA decisions are made. He stated
that he is not aware of any railroading of provisions through the governing
body and that every school is allowed to voice an opinion. 281 Thus, it would
seem that a program that most schools do not agree with will not be
implemented.
c. Conclusions
Generally, Gregg sees the results of the program as a benefit. As a South-
west Conference school, most athletes at SMU are tested on a random, sea-
son-long basis. 28 2 Gregg's perception is that drugs are obviously a large
276. Id.
277. Id. He noted various ways he had seen athletes mask test results and he believes,
based on his collegiate and professional experience, the only way to conduct a valid test is to
observe it. Id.
278. Id. Gregg also feels that all the negatives that come out of steroid use far outweigh
the benefit and this is an aspect that needs to be stressed in education. But in terms of amphet-
amines and other drugs, he feels they do nothing to enhance performance.
279. Interview with Forrest Gregg, supra note 268.
280. Id.
281. Id. This tends to diminish the inferences in cases like Hill that the drug provisions
were forced through with most of the schools dissenting.
282. Id. The Southwest Conference testing program is basically co-extensive with the
NCAA program, with minor procedural and protocol changes each year. See Appendix I,
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problem in today's overall culture, but athletes are spotlighted on the play-
ing field and are role models for many people. While the drug problem is
obviously greater on the street than on the playing field, athletes are subject
to much greater scrutiny and must accept that responsibility when making
the decision to participate.28 3 To sum up Gregg's opinion, drug use has de-
creased overall in college athletics due to the combination of education and
testing, both of which are vehicles to prevent the real demon related to drug
use, addiction. 284
Gregg notes that cases like Roy Tarpley and Dexter Manley are unfortu-
nate because drugs have become the most important things in their lives
since they are willing to give up lucrative careers to use drugs. The obvious
addiction in those cases is likely something that the NCAA program may
help to prevent. Many similar cases have cropped up in recent years. 285
B. THE FUTURE FOR THE NCAA GENERALLY
New state statutes in Florida, Illinois, Nebraska, and Nevada may pose a
significant threat to the manner in which the NCAA conducts its programs
and investigations.28 6 The Tarkanian Supreme Court ruling caused a great
furor because it established that the NCAA, since it is not a state actor, need
not abide by the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution.287 While the
Tarkanian investigation involved questions of illegal cash payments to play-
ers, the effects of potential and pending retaliatory laws authored by state
legislators may have long-reaching effects for the NCAA drug testing pro-
gram. States are beginning to determine that they must ensure fair investiga-
tion and due process by the NCAA through state laws.2 8 As anger in the
states grows toward the NCAA, drug testing may become a victim of that
anger.
Many states currently have state privacy protections that are broader than
federal constitutional standards. 28 9 If state courts are forced to examine
these provisions more closely, as the courts in Hill and Derdeyn were, the
NCAA may begin to consistently lose drug testing challenges based on state
privacy protections. Other states that lack broader protections may be pres-
sured to author state constitutional amendments which protect their citizens
SWC Drug Testing Program, SWC DIRECTORY, CONSTITUTION, BYLAWS AND SPORTS
MANUAL, 57 (1991-92).
283. Interview with Forrest Gregg, supra note 268.
284. Id.
285. See Gary McClain & Jeffrey Marx, A Bad Trip, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 16, 1987,
at 42 (describing how Villanova basketball star and national champion Gary McClain became
addicted to cocaine).
286. Constance Johnson, De-fense against the NCAA, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT,
Jan. 13, 1991, at 25.
287. Id. at 25; see supra note 197; contra James L. Arslanian, The NCAA and State Action:
Does The Creature Control Its Master?, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 333 (1990) (proposing that Justice
White's dissent in Tarkanian was the better reasoned position).
288. See Arslanian, supra note 287.
289. See Cathcart, supra note 8.
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from drug testing intrusions, especially in situations where a "compelling
interest" standard would not be met.
C. STATES WHERE CHALLENGE Is RIPE
Explicit state constitutional privacy protections are currently contained in
several state constitutions. 290 For example, under the Florida constitution,
Florida courts have held random drug testing unreasonable but approved
drug testing based on reasonable suspicion.29 1 In New York, the court of
appeals held that both the state and federal constitutions prohibited drug
testing of all probationary teachers, barring reasonable suspicion.292 Several
state constitutions also contain explicit constitutional language that would
appear to offer protection from drug testing, but no one has yet made signifi-
cant challenges in those venues.
For example, in Montana, the constitution states, "The right of the indi-
vidual to privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not
be infringed upon without the showing of a compelling State interest. '293
This language appears to create a judicial climate similar to that in Derdeyn,
where the court found that the justifications for drug testing student athletes
fell short of a compelling state interest. 294 Given that such state constitu-
tional provisions currently exist in many states, that more may be passed,
and that several state courts have recognized state privacy provisions as a
basis for protection from NCAA drug testing, any future challenges will
likely be directed toward the state avenues, especially given the requirement
of state action for challenge on Fourth Amendment grounds.
V. CONCLUSION: A COMPROMISE OF TESTING BASED ON
INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION
Since the NCAA drug testing program is obviously facing many fierce
legal challenges, its program and others like it should be changed to utilize
individualized suspicion rather than random methods. Steroids are the only
drug that student athletes realistically use for performance enhancement and
the only drug likely to be detected. The side effects of steroids are obvious to
anyone around the athlete for any period of time295 and create the ideal
conditions for drug testing based on individualized suspicion of use.296
290. Id.
291. City of Palm Beach v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. App. 5th Dist. 1985). The state
based privacy protection is contained in Florida Constitution Art. I., § 23, which states:
Every Natural person has the right to be left alone and free from governmental
intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein.
FLA. CONST. art. I., § 23.
292. Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 510 N.E.2d 325 (N.Y.
1987).
293. MONT. CONsT. art. II., § 10.
294. Derdeyn, 832 P.2d at 1034-35. This may also be a reason why the University of Mon-
tana has modified their drug testing program. See Gibbs, supra note 190.
295. Not only do steroids cause increased aggressiveness, but they also may cause hair loss
and acne, along with other varying effects. Interview with Forrest Gregg, supra note 268.
296. The NCAA situation appears analogous to Skinner, where reasonable suspicion of
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Coaches and their assistants are in a perfect position to recognize behavior
suggesting drug use. Similarly, it is in their best interests to keep their play-
ers drug free. Some critics will argue that coaches will overlook or even
quietly encourage drug use, but the responsibility in this area must fall on
both the schools and the regulatory body.
Institutions must take a harder look at their coaching staffs based on both
their integrity and experience, rather than just the latter. Moreover, compli-
ance directors, or similarly situated personnel, who oversee an academic in-
stitution's compliance with eligibility factors, are already properly situated
in many schools to observe and police both the athletes activities and the
coaches monitoring them.297 Given the fact that the NCAA is poorly re-
ceived by many state legislatures and that the drug testing program and sim-
ilar ones are likely to face many successful state challenges, implementing an
individualized suspicion program would be an appropriate gesture to pacify
the athletes. It would also allow the program to withstand constitutional
scrutiny more readily because any court examining a program based on indi-
vidualized suspicion would not face the additional hurdle of justifying the
program's lack of reasonable suspicion, and the program would more readily
meet a compelling interest inquiry. It would not, however, destroy the es-
sential goals and benefits of the program.298
The NCAA athletic program and the experience it offers to both student
athletes and fans is unique.299 Unfortunately, collegiate athletics often
brings out both the best and worst in people. Drug use is obviously an im-
portant issue in the context of student athletics and one with which the
schools and the governing body are justifiably concerned. But as Forrest
Gregg pointed out, these student athletes cannot be expected to major in
"drug education" and drugs are not a part of the vast majority's lives. Edu-
cation and testing together play a role in deterring drug use, but reasonable
responses to difficult issues typically yield the best results.
Presently, the NCAA program, and related ones, face an uphill battle for
their continued existence. Derdeyn and Hill offer insights into how many
state court battles will be fought and what the probable outcome for the
drug use by a supervisor (or a train accident) was required to trigger urinalysis. See supra
notes 16-20 and accompanying text. Given the more compelling basis for testing in Skinner,
anything more than an individualized suspicion NCAA testing program seems overly intrus-
tive in the student athletic context.
297. For example, SMU employs Charles Howard as a compliance director. He has exten-
sive legal and NCAA training and is fully equipped to oversee a program based on individual-
ized suspicion and to assure that coaches are alert to signs of drug use, forcing suspicious cases
to be tested. When combined with an athletic director like Forrest Gregg, players and coaches
receive a clear message about drug use: DO IT OR ALLOW IT AND YOU ARE GONE.
298. In cases of serious drug use, like Dexter Manley and Roy Tarpley, the signs of grow-
ing addiction are obvious and individualized suspicion would function perhaps even more ef-
fectively than random testing, since the athlete could be tested when use was occurring. See
supra note 255 (discussing Tarpley's cocaine addiction); see also Ira Berkow, Why Manley?
Why Now?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1989, § D, at 19 (Manley was banished from the NFL for
life after his third positive test for substance abuse).
299. Consider the fact that the term "March Madness" is used to describe the interest in
the annual NCAA basketball tournament.
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NCAA is. While Fourth Amendment challenges to these drug testing pro-
grams have been largely unsuccessful, with the exception of Derdeyn, new
life has been given to challengers in the form of state constitutional provi-
sions. A program based on individualized suspicion would continue to fulfill
the NCAA justifications for the program, but it would leave students feeling
less violated and would give schools a greater role in the program because of
their monitoring function. Such a program would enhance the cooperation
required between institutions and their regulating body and perhaps foster
growth rather than ill-will.
Regardless of what changes take place in the future, drugs and drug test-
ing programs will remain in some respect. The NCAA and the institutions
that comprise it have taken a leading role with respect to the resolution of
many difficult issues. At present, it is necessary for the NCAA to reevaluate
its methods and goals, and to recognize that the program's goals may be
achieved in a manner less intrusive to personal privacy concerns. The health
and vitality of both NCAA athletes and the NCAA athletic program are
dependent on a proper balance of these competing interests.


